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The Newfoundland Offshore Reference: Federal-Provincial
Conflict Over Offshore Energy Resources
Edward A. Fitzgerald*
There has been a great deal of conflict in federal systems between
the central and peripheral governments pertaining to jurisdiction over
offshore lands. The central focus of this struggle has been control over
offshore energy resources. This conflict occurred between the federal and
provincial governments in Canada. One of the major battles in the Cana-
dian controversy involved the federal government and the provincial
government of Newfoundland.'
Newfoundland claimed jurisdiction over its territorial sea and con-
tinental shelf. The offshore lands claimed by Newfoundland comprised
700,000 square miles, an area five times larger than its land mass. New-
foundland estimated that its continental shelf contained forty trillion cu-
bic feet of natural gas and three and a half billion barrels of oil.2
Newfoundland was very concerned with the development of its off-
shore energy resources. Newfoundland, seeking to avoid social and eco-
nomic disruptions, wanted development to occur at a pace and in a
manner that would benefit the province. Newfoundland hoped that off-
shore energy development would provide a stimulus for economic devel-
opment which would enable the province to contribute to the Canadian
confederation.3 The federal government, however, opposed Newfound-
land's assertion of jurisdiction.
When negotiations failed to resolve the controversy, litigation in-
volving questions of British Commonwealth law, Canadian constitu-
tional law, and international law ensued. The Newfoundland Court of
Appeal held that Newfoundland had jurisdiction over the submerged
lands beneath its territorial sea.' The Supreme Court of Canada, as well
* Ph.D., J.D. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Wright State University
(Dayton, Ohio).
I This conflict has also occurred in the United States, Fitzgerald, The Tidelands Controversy
Revisited, 19 ENVTL L. REv. 209 (1988), and in Australia, New South Wales v. Commonwealth 8
A.L.R. 1 (1975).
2 DEP'T OF MINES & ENERGY, NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, HERITAGE OF THE
SEA.. .OUR CASE ON OFFSHORE MINERAL RIGHTS 2 (1982) [hereinafter HERITAGE OF THE SEA].
3 Id. at 6-10.
4 Reference Re Mineral and Other Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf, 145 D.L.R.3d
9, 20-36, 41 (1983).
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as the Newfoundland Court of Appeal,5 found that Newfoundland did
not possess jurisdiction over the continental shelf.6
This article will demonstrate that the Canadian Supreme Court's
decision was erroneous. Newfoundland achieved dominion status under
the Balfour Declaration in 1926. As a dominion, Newfoundland inher-
ited the rights which the Crown claimed for the province, including
rights in the territorial sea. Newfoundland exercised jurisdiction over
the territorial sea before and after attaining dominion status. Newfound-
land did not surrender any property rights to the Commission govern-
ment which ruled Newfoundland between 1934 and 1949. Even if
Newfoundland had relinquished such rights, Term 7 of the Terms of
Union restored Newfoundland's Constitution as it had existed prior to
Commission government in 1934. Term 7 granted Newfoundland any
property rights that were recognized up to the time of confederation.
Prior to confederation, continental shelf rights emerged as a principle of
customary international law. Term 37 of the Terms of Union allowed
Newfoundland to retain "all lands, mines, minerals, and royalties be-
longing to Newfoundland at the date of Union." When Newfoundland
confederated with Canada in 1949, Newfoundland retained rights over
the territorial sea and the continental shelf.
I. THE NEWFOUNDLAND OFFSHORE REFERENCE
Offshore petroleum development in Canada first occurred under
provincial authority off the coast of Prince Edward Island in 1943. The
province of British Columbia began issuing permits for offshore energy
exploration in 1949. Federal licensing of offshore operations began in
1960, two years after the signing of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf. The federal regulations declared provincial permits invalid and
instructed holders of provincial permits to apply for federal licenses.7
The provinces did not accede to the usurpation of provincial authority.
In 1960, Nova Scotia required Socony Mobile of Canada to obtain pro-
vincial permits for offshore energy development on over one million
acres off the shore of Sable Island. In 1963, Nova Scotia informed Shell
Oil that the province did not recognize federal jurisdiction over offshore
energy development.8 Negotiations between the federal and provincial
governments proved futile.
The federal government sought to resolve the conflict by referring
5 Id. at 36-41.
6 Reference Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, 5
D.L.R.4th 385, 419 (1984).
7 Gault, Jurisdiction over the Petroleum Resources of the Canadian Continental Shelf: The
Emerging Picture, 23 ALTA. L. RE'V. 75, 80 (1985).
8 Treby, The Role of the Political Idiom in Jurisdictional Conflicts Over Offshore Oil and Gas, 5
J. MAR. L. & COM. 281, 292 (1974).
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the jurisdictional question to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court of Canada was a general court of appeals which provided
for the better administration of the laws of Canada. The Supreme Court
of Canada could issue advisory opinions and consider questions of law
and fact that were relevant to the Canadian constitution and had been
referred to it by the Governor in Council. 9 On April 26, 1965, the
Governor-in-Council, by an order of Council, asked the Supreme Court
of Canada to determine whether the submerged lands beneath the territo-
rial sea were the property of British Columbia or Canada and whether
British Columbia or Canada had the right to explore and exploit the sea-
bed and subsoil of the continental shelf.10
While awaiting the decision, the federal and provincial governments
were active. Each of the maritime provinces - New Brunswick, New-
foundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island-issued exploratory
permits for offshore energy resources. British Columbia annexed an area
of the seabed which was equal to one-half of its land mass. The federal
government continued to issue exploration permits under the federal reg-
ulations. By the summer of 1967, federal exploration permits were issued
for over two hundred and eighteen million offshore acres. The double
licensing requirement was very expensive for the energy companies
which, out of caution, complied with both provincial and federal
regulations.1 I
In November 1967, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its deci-
sion in Reference Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia.2 The
Supreme Court of Canada rejected British Columbia's claim of jurisdic-
tion over the territorial sea and the continental shelf. 3 The Court, rely-
ing on the rationale of The Queen v. Keyn,14 held that the provincial
boundary ended at the low water mark. 5 The provincial boundary could
have been extended by Parliament, but was not. Since the territorial sea
was outside of British Columbia, the province lacked jurisdiction over
the area. After British Columbia confederated with Canada in 1871, the
Crown's rights in the territorial sea which were claimed for British Co-
lumbia became Crown rights held for Canada. 6 The Crown's rights
9 Rubin, The Nature Use and Effect of Reference Cases in Canadian Constitutional Law, 6
MCGILL L. . 168 (1960); Russel, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada, 6 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 1, 10-11 (1968).
10 Reference re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, 1967 S.C.R. 792,
65 D.L.R.2d 353 (1968).
11 Head, The Canadian Offshore Minerals Reference: The Application of International Law to a
Federal Constitution, 18 U. TORoNTo L. J. 131, 134 (1968).
12 1967 S.C.R. 792, 65 D.L.R.2d 353.
13 Id
14 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876).
15 1967 S.C.R. at 817, 65 D.L.R.2d at 376.
16 1967 S.C.R. at 815 65 D.L.R.2d at 373.
19911
CASE W. RES. J. IN7L Lo
were transferred to Canada upon independence which occurred between
1919 and 1931.17 Furthermore, the Court determined that since conti-
nental shelf rights were sovereign rights, not property rights, Canada was
entitled to such rights."5
Canadian interest in offshore energy development diminished after
the British Columbia Offshore Reference. In 1972 the federal govern-
ment declared a moratorium on offshore development off the coast of
British Columbia for environmental protection.19 In 1976 the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Reference re Ownership of the Bed of the
Strait of Georgia and Related Areas20 found that the province held title
to the seabed and subsoil which lies between Vancouver Island and main-
land British Columbia. The Court distinguished the Georgia Strait Ref-
erence from the British Columbia Offshore Reference on the grounds
that the British Columbia Offshore Reference only dealt with sovereign
rights over the territorial sea and continental shelf, not jurisdiction over
the lands beneath inland waters.21 The federal government appealed the
decision to the Canadian Supreme Court, which upheld the appellate
court's decision.22
The conflict over offshore energy resources was also underway in the
Atlantic provinces. At a federal-provincial conference in 1964, the four
Atlantic provinces established their maritime boundaries.23 The federal
government asserted that the British Columbia Offshore Reference had
resolved the Atlantic provinces claims, but the federal government was
willing to negotiate with the Atlantic provinces concerning offshore man-
agement and revenue sharing.2'
In 1977, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was reached be-
tween the federal government and the maritime provinces of New Bruns-
wick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. 21 The MOU was designed
17 Id at 374-75, 1967 S.C.R. at 815-16.
18 1967 S.C.R. at 817-21, 65 D.L.R.2d at 376-80.
19 Gault, supra note 7, at 81.
20 1 B.C.L.R. 97 (1976) [hereinafter Georgia Strait Reference].
21 Id at 103-04.
22 Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of British Columbia, 4 W.W.R. 289
(1984).
23 Gault, supra note 7, at 81.
24 Id
25 The MOU provided for the establishment of a Mineral Offshore Resource Board which was
comprised of six members: three federal and one from each province. The offshore area was divided
into two areas by a line drawn at least five kilometers seaward of the low water mark. Areas land-
ward of the line were to be administered by the province or the Board if so designated. The prov-
inces would receive all of the revenues derived from this area. The area seaward of the line was to be
administered by the Board. The federal government would receive twenty-five percent of the reve-
nues. The remaining seventy-five percent of the revenues would be divided among the provinces
according to their boundaries and subject to a regional revenue sharing pool which was established
by the agreement. Nova Scotia would receive all of the revenues derived from development off Sable
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to be the beginning of a more comprehensive agreement. Nova Scotia
withdrew from the agreement when Premier Buchanan came to power.26
Nova Scotia's decision to withdraw was encouraged by the federal Con-
servative government, which was in power in 1979-80. Conservative
Prime Minister Clarke expressed his intent to place the administration
of offshore energy development in the hands of the provinces, which
would receive all of the revenues derived from production. The Con-
servatives, however, soon lost power. Their Liberal successors did not
support provincial jurisdiction, but advocated cooperation and revenue
sharing.
27
In March 1982, Canada and Nova Scotia concluded an agreement
providing for joint management and revenue sharing.2 8 Both parties
were satisfied with the agreement. The agreement gave the federal gov-
ernment some leverage to persuade Newfoundland to seek a political so-
lution to the conflict. The federal government was less confident in its
legal claims against Newfoundland than in those against Nova Scotia.29
From the provincial perspective, Nova Scotia feared a negative judicial
decision. The province needed economic activity to counter a recession.
Nova Scotia was also worried that if Newfoundland's offshore energy
resources were developed first, all of the energy industry's attention
would be directed at Newfoundland at the expense of Nova Scotia's
natural gas production.30
Island. Gault, Recent Developments in the Federal-Provincial Dispute Concerning Jurisdiction Over
Offshore Petroleum Resources, 21 ALTA. L. Rav. 97, 104-05 (1983).
26 Id. at 106.
Nova Scotia was critical of the agreement for several reasons. First, Nova Scotia was unsatis-
fied with the 75/25% split. Nova Scotia asserted that when federal income tax was factored in, the
resulting division would be one third provincial and two thirds federal with the federal government
retaining effective control over regulation and administration. Second, Nova Scotia was critical of
having only one member on the Board when 95% of the resources were off its shore. Finally, Nova
Scotia was doubtful that the federal government would honor the most favored province clause.
27 Gault, supra note 7, at 83.
28 The federal government was granted jurisdiction over offshore energy development. Nova
Scotia agreed to accept the federal licensing system (COGA), the federal legal regime for manage-
ment (OGPCA), and the federal administration system (COGLA). The Federal Minister of Energy,
Mines, and Resources would develop offshore regulations. The province received a percentage of the
federal governments 25% interest under COGA, 50% of the Crown's share of the natural gas, and
25% of the Crown's share of oil reserves. The province was guaranteed sufficient quantities of oil
and gas from the scotian shelf to cover its present and future needs. The province was to receive
other revenues until it achieved the status of a "have" province, at which time these revenues would
be distributed as revenue sharing. Furthermore, if the federal government entered into a more
favorable agreement with any other province, Nova Scotia had the right to substitute that agreement
for the present agreement. Gault, supra note 25, at 106-08.
29 Doucet, Canadian-Nova Scotia Offshore Agreement One Year Later, 22 ALTA. L. Rav.
132, 133 (1984). See also, MacDonald & Thompson, The Atlantic Accord: The Politics of Compro-
mise, 24 ALTA. L. REV. 61 (1985).
30 Doucet, supra note 29; MacDonald & Thompson, supra note 29.
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Newfoundland had withdrawn from the federal-provincial negotia-
tions early in the process to pursue an independent path. On October
24, 1977, Newfoundland enacted offshore regulations which provided
for: 1) preference for Newfoundland labor, goods, and services; 2) com-
pulsory training, research, and development programs in the province;
3) the landing in the province of any oil and gas produced offshore; 4)
minimum expenditures within the province; 5) preference for local refin-
ing, processing, and consumption of oil and gas; and 6) provincial control
over the rate of development.31 On March 1, 1978, Newfoundland's
Minister of Mines and Energy announced the issuance of the first permit
to Shell Resources Limited under the new regulations.32 Other permits
soon followed.33
Negotiations between the federal government and Newfoundland
continued. Newfoundland proposed that the revenues derived from off-
shore energy development should be allocated in such a manner that
Newfoundland could achieve a level of economic maturity and indepen-
dence which was comparable to Alberta, Ontario, or British Columbia.
Newfoundland suggested that the management of offshore areas should
be entrusted to a joint agency, be operated under regulations agreed to
by the parties, and be administered by an executive body comprised of
three federal and two provincial appointees (with a jointly appointed
chair). Each government would retain a degree of exclusive control, but
each would be required to justify unilateral action based upon joint crite-
ria.3a The federal government was amenable to provincial participation
and revenue sharing, but would not relinquish control over offshore
development.35
The negotiations between the federal government and Newfound-
land became strained in 1982 as a result of the litigation in Re Seafarers'
Int'l Union of Can. v. Crosbie Offshore Services Ltd.36 This case arose
when the Canadian Labor Relations Board (CLRB) refused to consider
an application by Seafarers' International Union to be certified as the
bargaining agent for some of the workers employed by Crosbie, an off-
shore supply vessel.37 The CLRB determined that it lacked jurisdiction
because the Newfoundland Labour Relations Board was considering ap-
plications by other unions concerning the certification of the same work-
31 Harrison, Natural Resources and the Constitution: Some Recent Developments and Their
Implications for the Future Regulation of the Resource Industries, 18 ALTA L. REv. 1, 15 (1980).
32 Id. at 16.
33 Id.
34 Gault, supra note 25, at 110.
35 Id.
36 135 D.L.R.3d 485 (F.C.A. 1982).
37 Id. at 486.
Vol. 23:1
THE NEWFOUNDLAND OFFHORE REFERENCE
ers.31 When the issue came before the Federal Court, the Attorney
General of Canada intervened on behalf of the Union. 39 The Attorney
General of Canada asserted that the controversy should be resolved in
favor of the CLRB because the federal government had jurisdiction over
all aspects of offshore energy operations, including offshore oil and gas
exploration and development.' The Attorney General of Newfound-
land intervened on behalf of Crosbie, alleging that, since Crosbie's ac-
tions were local, Newfoundland had jurisdiction over the question.4'
Furthermore, the issue of jurisdiction over offshore energy resources was
irrelevant to the question presented.42
The Federal Court held that the CLRB's decision was incorrect be-
cause Crosbie's activities were subject to federal jurisdiction with respect
to shipping. The Court avoided the jurisdictional issue regarding off-
shore energy resources because it was not germane to the case.43 Never-
theless, the federal government's attempt to broaden the dispute"
angered Newfoundland because it demonstrated bad faith in the negotia-
tions. Newfoundland recognized that the question of jurisdiction over
offshore energy resources would have to be resolved by the courts. On
February 28, 1982, the Lt. Governor of Newfoundland requested the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal to determine whether the federal or pro-
vincial government had jurisdiction over offshore energy resources.45
On May 19, 1982, the federal government responded by asking the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court to decide whether the federal or provincial gov-
ernment had jurisdiction over the Hibernia oil field which was located
one hundred and seventy miles east south-east off St. John's,
Newfoundland.'
The Newfoundland Court of Appeal recognized that the British Co-
lumbia Offshore Reference was controlling, but found that the constitu-
tional, historical, and legal changes from 1871 to 1949 produced different
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 487.
41 Id,
42 Gault, supra note 25, at 111.
43 Id
44 Id
45 The following question was presented:
Do the lands, mines, minerals, royalties or other rights, including the right to explore and
exploit and the right to legislate, with respect to the mineral and other natural resources
of the seabed and subsoil from the ordinary low-water mark of the Province of New-
foundland to the seaward limit of the continental shelf or any part thereof belong or
otherwise appertain to the Province of Newfoundland?
145 D.L.R.3d at 9.
46 The federal government restricted the court's inquiry to the Hibernia oil field because
offshore development was stalled as a result of the jurisdictional dispute. Gault, supra note 25, at
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conclusions regarding Newfoundland.47 The Newfoundland Court of
Appeal determined that Newfoundland achieved dominion status under
the Statute of Westminster in 1931.48 Newfoundland, as a sovereign
state, exercised jurisdiction over its territorial sea.49 The Commission
government which ruled Newfoundland from 1934 through 1949 did
not revoke Newfoundland's sovereignty. Newfoundland was not re-
duced to colonial status, nor were its rights over the territorial sea
affected.50 The Terms of Union did not restrict Newfoundland's juris-
diction to land territory." Consequently, Newfoundland had jurisdic-
tion over the submerged lands beneath its territorial sea.5 2
The Newfoundland Court of Appeal found that continental shelf
rights were recognized by international law in 1949 and Newfoundland,
as a sovereign state, could have acquired such rights.53 International
law did not, however, establish such rights for municipal purposes. The
Court held that such rights had to be asserted. 4 Since Newfoundland
never claimed rights over the continental shelf, it did not have jurisdic-
tion over continental shelf resources. 5
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision followed the Newfound-
land Court of Appeal's decision. Because of the question posed, the
Supreme Court of Canada did not address the issue of jurisdiction over
the territorial sea.56 The Supreme Court of Canada arrived at the same
conclusion as the Newfoundland Court of Appeal regarding the conti-
nental shelf, but for different reasons. The Supreme Court of Canada
found that Newfoundland had achieved sovereign status as a domin-
ion.57 Newfoundland, however, surrendered all attributes of sovereignty
and returned to its former colonial status during the Commission govern-
ment.5 8 During this time, Newfoundland was incapable of acquiring
continental shelf rights. Any continental shelf rights acquired by the
Commission government were held by the Crown in right of Great Brit-
47 145 D.L.R.3d at 14-20.
48 Id. at 24-29.
49 Id at 29-31.
50 I d at 31-34.
51 Id at 34-36.
52 Id at 41.
53 Id. at 40.
54 Id. at 40-41.
5 Id.
56 Gault, supra note 25 at 1 11. The question posed to the court was:
In respect of the mineral and other natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the
continental shelf, in the area offshore Newfoundland.. .has Canada or Newfoundland (1)
the right to explore and exploit the said mineral and other natural resources, and (2)
legislative jurisdiction to make laws in relation to the exploration and exploitation of the
said mineral and other natural resources?
57 5 D.L.R.4th at 401-03.
58 Id. at 403-06.
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ain.s9 Even if Newfoundland had acquired continental shelf rights, it
would have forfeited such rights, which were an attribute of external
sovereignty, upon confederation with Canada.' Under the Terms of
Union, Newfoundland's jurisdiction was restricted to areas within pro-
vincial boundaries.61
The Supreme Court of Canada also determined that continental
shelf rights were not recognized by international law in 1949.62 Such
rights did not receive international recognition until the Convention on
the Continental Shelf in 1958.63 At that time, rights over the continental
shelf accrued to Canada as the external sovereign. 4 Furthermore, the
International Court of Justice decision in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases held that continental shelf rights existed ipso facto and ab
initio only after the signing of the Continental Shelf Convention in
1958.65
II. NEWFOUNDLAND'S DOMINION STATUS
The Supreme Court of Canada examined Newfoundland's status as
a colony, dominion and province to determine Newfoundland's rights
under British Commonwealth law, Canadian constitutional law and in-
ternational law. The Supreme Court of Canada correctly decided that
Newfoundland possessed sufficient external sovereignty between the Bal-
four Declaration in 1926 and Commission government in 1934 to claim
existing offshore rights.66
Newfoundland was discovered by John Cabot in 1497. In 1583,
England acquired Newfoundland and governed it by Royal preroga-
tive.67 In 1610, the Crown Charter granted Newfoundland ownership
over the "sea and islands lying within ten leagues of any part of the
coast."'68 In 1729, the first governor of Newfoundland was appointed
with "extensive but defined powers [over] a definite area of land."69 Be-
ginning in 1791, Newfoundland had its own judicial system which exer-
cised jurisdiction over "crimes and misdemeanors committed on the
Banks of Newfoundland or arm of the seas or islands to which Ships or
59 Id. at 406.
60 Id at 407.
61 Id at 409-10.
62 Id at 410-11.
63 Id at 411.
64 Id. at 417-18.
65 Id at 417-19.
66 Id at 401-03.
67 145 D.L.R.3d at 24.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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Vessels depart from Newfoundland for carrying on fisheries."7 ° The
Newfoundland Supreme Court was established in 1824 and the New-
foundland legislature was formed in 1833.71 In 1844, Newfoundland was
entitled to the beneficial uses and proceeds from public lands. By 1855,
Newfoundland had a responsible government which exercised jurisdic-
tion over its territorial sea for various purposes, such as customs and
fishing. Even though Newfoundland was a self-governing colony, New-
foundland did not possess external sovereignty. Newfoundland relied on
Great Britain to conduct its foreign relations and international affairs.72
In the early twentieth century, the British Empire began to evolve
into the British Commonwealth, which was recognized as a commumity
of free nations or dominions united under a common sovereign. The
growing independence of the Commonwealth nations was recognized in
Imperial Conferences in 1923, 1926 and 1930.73 The Balfour Declara-
tion, which was announced at the Imperial Conference in 1926, declared
the Commonwealth nations to be "autonomous communities within the
British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in
any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a com-
mon allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the
British Commonwealth of Nations."74
Another significant convention which was recognized by the Impe-
rial Conference in 1926 asserted that the Governor of Newfoundland
..is the representative of the Crown, holding in all essential respects
the same position in relation to the administration of public affairs in
the Dominion as is held by His Majesty the King in Great Britain, and
that he is not the representative or agent of His Majesty's Government
in Great Britain or of any Department of that Government.75
The Balfour Declaration established Newfoundland's dominion sta-
tus. 76 The Balfour Declaration recognized the autonomy and equality of
the dominions which had responsibility for their domestic and foreign
affairs. The relationship between the dominions and Great Britain was
described by Sir Cecil Hurst as follows:
The equality in status is not inconsistent with the continued existence
of legal rights now vested in the Parliament of Great Britain, or in the
ministers of the crown in Great Britain which are not vested in the
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See generally, HERITAGE OF THE SEA, supra note 2; 145 D.L.R.3d at 24-25; Factum of the
Attorney General of Newfoundland, at 10-12; 5 D.L.R.4th at 385.
73 145 D.L.R.3d at 25.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 W. GILMORE, NEWFOUNDLAND AND DOMINION STATUS: THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS COM-
PETENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUS OF NEWFOUNDLAND, 1855-1934 206-227 (1988).
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dominion parliaments or ministers, provided that those rights are only
exercised in respect of any dominion in accordance with the wishes of
the parliament or the people or the government of the dominion
concerned. 7
The Statute of Westminster in 1931 formally acknowledged the sov-
ereignty of the dominions and adjusted the legal forms to reflect existing
principles of autonomy and equality.78 The preamble stated "that the
British Commonwealth is a free association of members united by a
[common] allegiance to the Crown."79 Section 1 enumerated New-
foundland among the British dominions. Section 2 stated that the Colo-
nial Law Validity Act was not applicable to the dominions and dominion
laws would not be void for repugnance with the Act. Section 3 granted
dominions the authority to enact laws with extraterritorial application.
Section 4 provided that no future law of Great Britain would apply to a
dominion without is express approval. Sections 5 and 6 declared that
certain laws of Great Britain were no longer applicable to dominion na-
tions. Section 10, which was inserted at the request of the affected do-
minions, stated that sections 2 through 6 would not apply to Australia,
Newfoundland and New Zealand. 0 These dominions could later adopt
these sections which would "be retroactive to any date to and including
the date of enactment of the Statute of Westminster, 1931. '
The Statute of Westminster was declarative, not constitutive, of
Newfoundland's sovereign status.82 Even though certain sections of the
Statute were not applicable to Newfoundland, the preamble recognized
"the established constitutional position" of the dominions. The High
Court of Australia held that the "established position" of the dominions
was "recognized rather than created by the Statute of Westminster." 3
The Supreme Court of Canada implicitly accepted this position in the
British Columbia Offshore Reference by declaring that Canada had at-
tained sovereignty between 1919 and 1931.84
From 1926 through 1934, Newfoundland possessed the same de-
gree of sovereignty as other dominions. 5 but was the least internation-
77 Id at 217.
78 145 D.L.R.3d at 26.
79 Id
80 Id
81 Id
82 GILMORE, supra note 76, at 206-17; see also Kovach, An Assessment of the Merits of New-
foundland's Claim to Offshore Resources, 23 CIry's L.. 18, 19 (1975).
83 Regina v. Burgess, Exp. Henry (1936), 55 C.L.R. 608 (H.C. ofA.),per Latham C.J., at 635,
cited in 145 D.L.R.3d at 28.
84 British Columbia Offshore Reference, supra note 10, 1967 S.C.R. 792, 816, 65 D.L.R.353,
375 (1967).
85 145 D.L.R.3d at 9, 26, 28. Lauterpacht described the status of dominions during this
period:
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ally active dominion. 6 Despite its eligibility, Newfoundland did not join
the League of Nations.8 7 Newfoundland allowed Great Britain to con-
duct its foreign policy.88 Nevertheless, the Newfoundland Court of Ap-
peal recognized that
Newfoundland had the constitutional capacity to assume full responsi-
bility for its external relations, free from external control, had it de-
sired to do so. The only practical effect of Newfoundland's
voluntarily relinquishing to His Majesty's Government in Great Brit-
ain the right to conduct her foreign affairs was that His Majesty's Gov-
ernment provided the appropriate diplomatic channel.
Newfoundland's consent had to be obtained before anything could be
done in her name. In short, before the introduction of the Commission
of Government in 1934, Newfoundland had the same degree of sover-
eignty as that enjoyed by the Dominion of Canada and the Common-
Though not States, they were subjects of international law. This attribution of interna-
tional rights and duties to States which are not fully sovereign entities was not a novel
development. Thus the heads and governments of British protectorates and protected
States have been treated as entitled to the jurisdictional immunities which international
law concedes to sovereign States. In general, protected States, though deprived of full
international capacity, have been regarded as international persons - as subjects of interna-
tional law.
Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q.R. 438, 445-46 (1947).
86 145 D.L.R.3d at 26.
87 Sir Cecil Hurst, legal advisor to the Foreign Office and later a Judge on the Permanent Court
of International Justice, stated that:
Newfoundland is admitted to membership in the periodical meetings of the Imperial Con-
ference in London on precisely the same footing as Canada or South Africa; she enjoys the
same measure of autonomy; she is mistress of her own destinies to the same extent as they
are; yet she has never been admitted as a member of the League of Nations. I do not know
that she even aspires to that somewhat burdensome recognition of the full measure of
freedom which she enjoys. If Newfoundland looks to the mother country to a greater
extent than do some of the other dominions for the conduct of her relations with foreign
powers, it is only because she chooses that path for herself; not because she is forced or
bound to do so.
Id. at 27.
88 Responding to an inquiry regarding the status of Newfoundland and the conduct of its exter-
nal relations, the Dominions Office in 1929 stated:
In the case of Newfoundland the practical application of this formula, in so far as it con-
cerns external affairs, is affected by two general considerations which do not arise in the
case of any other Dominion. The first and more important of these considerations is
that.. .His Majesty's Government in Newfoundland have voluntarily decided to leave the
conduct of the greater part of their external affairs in the hands of His Majesty's Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom. The second consideration is that Newfoundland, alone of
the Dominions, is not a separate member of the League of Nations. In consequence the
representation of her interests in League matters falls to His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom but she is fully consulted whenever those interests are likely to be af-
fected .. .(This consideration also affects to some. extent the form of treaties applying to
Newfoundland).
Id. at 27.
Vol. 23:1
THE NEWFOUNDLAND OFFSHORE REFERENCE
wealth of Australia.89
III. COMMISSION GOVERNMENT
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Commission govern-
ment, which ruled Newfoundland from 1934 through 1949, was granted
sole authority over Newfoundland's internal and external affairs. Since
Newfoundland's government was suspended, Newfoundland was re-
duced to its former colonial status. Any offshore rights that were ac-
quired during this period were held by the Crown in right of Great
Britain. 90 The Supreme Court of Canada was mistaken. Newfoundland
did not relinquish its sovereignty during this period, thus Newfoundland
was entitled to any rights that were acquired under international law.91
In 1932-33, Newfoundland's economy collapsed because New-
foundland was unable to meet the interest charged on its public debt.92
In February 1933, the Amulree Commission was appointed to investi-
gate and recommend solutions to the crisis.9 3 In October 1933, the
Amulree Commission issued its report which recommended that Great
Britain "assume financial responsibility for Newfoundland, that New-
foundland's Constitution be suspended, and that the conduct of its af-
fairs be vested in the Governor, advised by an appointed commission."94
The British Parliament, at the request of Newfoundland's Parlia-
ment, enacted the Newfoundland Act of 1933 to implement the Amulree
Commission's recommendations.95 Newfoundland's patent letters of
1876 and 1905, which embodied Newfoundland's Constitution, were sus-
pended. A new patent letter, establishing the Commission, was issued in
1934.96 The Commission consisted of a governor and six commissioners,
all of whom were appointed by Great Britain.97 The Commission exer-
cised all executive and legislative functions for Newfoundland and was
under the supervision of the United Kingdom Dominions Office.98 The
Commission government was to remain in effect on the understanding
that "as soon as the Island's difficulties are overcome and the country is
again self-supporting, responsible government, on request from the peo-
ple of Newfoundland, would be restored."9 9 From a constitutional per-
89 Id. at 28.
90 5 D.L.R.4th at 406.
91 Id
92 145 D.L.R.3d at 31.
93 Id
94 Id
95 Id
96 Id
97 Id
98 Id
99 Id
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spective, Great Britain and the Commission were "the trustees for
future government in Newfoundland."" °
During the Commission government, Great Britain, with few excep-
tions, respected the constitutional concerns which were embodied in the
Statute of Westminster. 10 1 Great Britain consulted with Newfoundland
before entering into international agreements which affected Newfound-
land. 10 2 In 1948, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the successor to
the Dominions Office, stated that if the International North West Atlan-
tic Fisheries Convention was signed prior to Union," the Newfoundland
representative might sign separately "for his Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom and the Government of Newfoundland in respect of
Newfoundland."' '
Other nations continued to recognize Newfoundland's sovereignty
during this period.1"4 Prior to the promulgation of the Truman Procla-
mation, which declared U.S. jurisdiction over the continental shelf, the
United States consulted with those "governments whose interests may be
concerned and whose concurrence is desirable, namely, Canada, New-
foundland, Mexico, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and Cuba." 105 In addition,
Canada maintained a High Commissioner in St. John's from 1941
through 1949 and concluded a number of bilateral treaties with New-
foundland during this period. 16
Even though Newfoundland's government was suspended, New-
foundland was not reduced to the status of a colony."17 International law
does not favor a relinquishment of sovereignty, but recognizes that a na-
tion only surrenders those powers which it voluntarily transfers."08 In
Duff Development Co., Ltd. v. Government Kelantan, the Privy Council
sustained the ruler of Kelantan's claim to sovereign immunity, despite
Kelantan's relinquishment of its authority over foreign affairs and inter-
nal administration to Great Britain."°9 The Board held that a state may
by treaty bargain away some of its authority, yet still maintain its sover-
100 Id. at 32.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 33.
103 Factum of the Attorney General of Canada 58 (Oct. 25, 1982).
104 145 D.L.R.3d at 32.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Martin, Newfoundland's Case on Offshore Minerals A Brief Outline, 70 OTrAWA L. REv.
34, 41 (1975). See also LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (8th ed. 1967);
Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952
I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27, 1952); Mighell v. Sultan of Johore 1 Q.B. 149 (1894).
109 A.C. 797 (1924).
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eignty. 110 From 1934 through 1949, Newfoundland retained its sover-
eignty, even though it surrendered some of its authority to Great Britain.
The Newfoundland Court of Appeal recognized that
in our view, neither the voluntary surrender of power for a terminable
period of time, nor the change in the nature of its government from a
democratic to an autocratic or quasi-dictatorial form, destroyed New-
foundland's dejure sovereignty as a coastal State. Thus, rights in the
submarine areas contiguous to their coasts accorded coastal States by
international law during the period in question were also available to
Newfoundland as a coastal State. 1 '
IV. TERM 7
The Supreme Court of Canada held that Term 7 of the Terms of
Union simply revived Newfoundland's Constitution to establish internal
self-government for the province, not to restore Newfoundland's former
dominion status." 2 The Court was mistaken. Term 7 revived New-
foundland's Constitution as a dominion and established responsible gov-
ernment for Newfoundland as a province of Canada. Term 7 restored
any rights which Newfoundland may have relinquished during the Com-
mission government and allowed Newfoundland to benefit from any de-
velopments under international law which occurred prior to
confederation.
Under the Newfoundland Act of 1933, self-government was to be
restored once Newfoundland achieved self-sufficiency.' 13 Newfound-
land's economy was revived as a result of World War II. In February
1946, plans were announced for a National Convention "to make recom-
mendations to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as to
possible forms of future government to be put before the people at a na-
tional referendum."1 1 4
The Convention recommended two options for the referendum: 1)
responsible government as it existed prior to 1934, and (2) Commission
government. Great Britain intervened and included a third option in the
referendum, confederation with Canada.
On July 7, 1948, after two referendums, the confederation option
prevailed over the responsible government option by a vote of 78,383 to
110 Id.; see also, Ippolito, Newfoundland and the Continental Shelfi From Cod to Oil and Gas,
15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 138, 156 n. 116 (1976).
111 145 D.L.R.3d at 32.
112 5 D.L.1L4th at 406-07.
113 Newfoundland Act, 1933, 24 Geo. 5, ch. 2, § 6, sched. 1.
114 MacLauchlan, Newfoundland's Continental Shel. The Jurisdictional Issue, 30 U.N.B. L.J.
91, 102 (198 1)(quoting An Act Relating to a National Convention, no. 16 of 1946 (Nfld)).
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71,334.115
The legal steps by which the confederation was' accomplished failed
to recognize Newfoundland's dominion status. The Canadian Parlia-
ment, following the Statute of Westminster, approved the proposed
Terms of Union and made a request to the King that the proposed bill of
confederation be placed before the Imperial Parliament. Formal action
by the Canadian Parliament was necessary because section 146 of the
British North America Act, which provided for the confederation of
Canada and Newfoundland, was inapplicable. Under section 146, both
the Newfoundland and Canadian legislatures had to approve confedera-
tion, then seek the approval of the Privy Council. Since Newfoundland's
legislature had been suspended in 1934 and had not reconvened, an act
of Parliament was necessary to realize the union. 6
Opponents of confederation argued that the process of achieving
confederation was unconstitutional. Six members of the pre-1934 New-
foundland Parliament brought suit challenging confederation. They al-
leged that 1) the Commission was required to restore responsible
government as soon as Newfoundland was self-supporting; 2) the Com-
mission had no power to place the confederation option on the referen-
dum; 3) the Commission was incapable of satisfying section 146 which
required the Newfoundland and Canadian Parliaments to request con-
federation; and 4) the Imperial Parliament could not confederate New-
foundland and Canada without the express request of the Newfoundland
Parliament.117
The trial court rendered its decision in Currie v. MacDonald on De-
cember 13, 1948."8 The court held that since Newfoundland had not
signed the Statute of Westminster, the Imperial Parliament could act for
Newfoundland. Under the Commission government, Newfoundland was
returned to its former colonial status. The Commission had discretion to
determine when responsible government would be restored to New-
foundland. Further, the Imperial Parliament had the authority to con-
federate Newfoundland with Canada." 9 The decision was appealed to
the Newfoundland Court of Appeal which sustained the trial court's de-
cision on January 22, 1949.120 Following the unsuccessful judicial chal-
lenge, the Imperial Parliament approved the Terms of Union and
Newfoundland became the tenth province of Canada on March 31, 1949.
Although the confederation process disregarded the legal formali-
ties which Newfoundland's dominion status warranted, Term 7 of the
115 Id. at 102-03.
116 Ippolito, supra note 110, at 159.
117 McLauchlan supra note 114, at 104.
118 Id. at 103-05 n.71 (citing Currie v. McDonald No. 436 of 1948, Nfld. S.C.).
119 Id.
120 Id.
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Terms of Union restored Newfoundland to its pre-1934 dominion status
prior to confederation. 2' This was clearly set forth in the language of
Term 7 which states that
[t]he Constitution of Newfoundland as it existed immediately
prior to the 16th day of February, 1934, is revived at the date of Union
and shall, subject to these terms and the British North America Acts,
1867 and 1946, continue as the Constitution of the Province of New-
foundland from and after the date of Union, until altered under the
authority of said Acts.1 22
Newfoundland's negotiators in 1948 realized that if Newfoundland
went directly from Commission government to a Canadian province,
constitutional questions might arise which could threaten the rights
which Newfoundland had achieved as a dominion. Newfoundland's
negotiators insisted on the inclusion of Term 7 which expressly revived
Newfoundland's Constitution prior to the time of union. 23 The impor-
tance of Term 7 was explained on February 8, 1949 by Prime Minister
Louis St. Laurent who stated
the delegation from Newfoundland and its law officers insisted that
they did not want the Province of Newfoundland to get a new constitu-
tion out of the Union. They wanted to be in the position of the Prov-
inces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which had constitutions
before Union and retained all the powers of their constitutions, except
those given to the central authority. It was for that reason that the
dean of the law school was insistent upon having the constitution re-
vived an instant before Union becomes effective. It will be revived only
because there will have been enacted an act by the United Kingdom
agreeing to this.1
24
There were also equitable considerations regarding Newfoundland's re-
tention of its dominion rights. During the referendum campaign in
1948, leading proponents of confederation, with the implicit approval of
Canada, asserted that the revival of Newfoundland's pre-Commission
constitution was unnecessary because Newfoundland would retain all of
its former rights as a dominion. Newfoundland's retention of its domin-
ion rights became a condition precedent to its approval of the confedera-
tion option. Otherwise, Newfoundland's approval of the confederation
option was accomplished by misrepresentation. 125
The Newfoundland Court of Appeal recognized that Term 7 re-
stored responsible government to Newfoundland, . . .as a province of
121 Id. at 106-07; Martin, supra note 108, at 41.
122 McLauchlan, supra note 114, at 106 (emphasis added).
123 Martin, supra note 108, at 41.
124 Id at 42.
125 Id; Inions, Newfoundland Offshore Claims, 19 ALTA L. REv. 461, 468 (1981).
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Canada."' 2 6 The powers retained by Newfoundland were governed by
the British North America Act of 1867. Consequently, it was necessary
to "look to that Act and the Terms of Union incorporated therein to
determine Newfoundland's present rights and legislative jurisdiction."' 127
V. TERM 37
The Supreme Court of Canada held that, according to the Terms of
Union and the British North America Act, the property retained by
Newfoundland after confederation was restricted to provincial bounda-
ries.1 28 Term 37 of the Terms of Union1 29 and section 109 of the British
North American Act 130 were similar in that they granted "lands, mines,
minerals, and royalties" to the provinces, but there was a subtle differ-
ence in the language. Section 109 of the British North America Act re-
stricted Crown grants to the provinces "in which the same are situate or
arise." Term 37 did not contain such a restriction. The Supreme Court
of Canada decided that the difference in the language between the two
sections was purely grammatical. The Court determined that the restric-
tion in section 109 was necessary because three former provinces became
four provinces.' The property rights referred to in section 109 were
public property rights which were held by the Crown in right of the
province and were restricted to provincial boundaries. The provinces
could only hold property outside of their boundaries in the legal capacity
of a private citizen. Since Term 37 was only concerned with property
rights, it could not encompass the continental shelf. Jurisdiction over the
continental shelf was not a property right, but an attribute of external
sovereignty which could not be held by the province. Even if Newfound-
land possessed external sovereignty in 1949, external sovereign rights
126 145 D.L.R.3d at 34.
127 Id
128 5 D.L.R.4th at 385.
129 Term 37 states:
All lands, mines, minerals, and royalties belonging to Newfoundland at the date of
Union, and all sums then due or payable for such lands mines, minerals, or royalties, shall
belong to the Province of Newfoundland, subject to any trusts existing in respect thereof,
and to any interest other than that of the Province in the same.
Id. at 408.
130 Section 109 states:
All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces of Can-
ada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union and all Sums then due or payable for
such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong to the several Provinces of Onta-
rio, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, sub-
ject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the
Province in the same.
131 Id at 408-10.
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passed to Canada upon confederation.132
The Supreme Court of Canada was mistaken for several reasons.
First, the Court's restriction of the property owned by Newfoundland to
that within provincial boundaries was contrary to the wording of Term
37 which states that Newfoundland retained "all lands, mines, minerals,
and royalties belonging to Newfoundland." The Supreme Court of Can-
ada read a condition into Term 37 which was absent. The difference in
the language between Term 37 and section 109 was significant. If Term
37 was the same as section 109, Term 37 would be superfluous because
Term 3 already incorporated section 109 into the Terms of Union.133
The Supreme Court of Canada should have followed the presumption
that "words are not omitted, when they have been used in a correspond-
ing clause in an earlier statute, without a reason."'1 34 Since there was a
difference in the language, the Supreme Court of Canada should have
distinguished the two provisions. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal
found that Term 37 "reserve[d] to the Province of Newfoundland all pro-
prietary rights both within and outside the land mass described in Term
2.,, 35
Second, the Supreme Court of Canada's characterization of conti-
nental shelf rights as external sovereign rights was irrelevant. There was
no question that the federal government was the external sovereign of
Canada, but this did not create federal jurisdiction over offshore lands. If
the principle that external sovereignty established property rights was
followed to its logical extreme, the federal government would have prop-
erty rights over all of Canada. The jurisdiction over Newfoundland's
offshore lands was governed by the British North American Act, 1867
and the Terms of Union.
136
The federal government had no general property rights which were
derived from its legislative and executive authority. 137 The federal gov-
ernment could only expropriate provincial property to accomplish a fed-
132 Id. at 407
133 Term 3 states:
The British North America Acts, 1867 to 1946, shall -apply to the Province of New-
foundland in the same way, and to the like extent as they apply to the provinces heretofore
comprised in Canada, as if the Province of Newfoundland had been one of the provinces
originally united, except in so far as varied by these Terms and except as such provi-
sions as are in terms made or by reasonable intendment may be held to be specially appli-
cable to or only to affect one or more and not all of the provinces originally united.
Id. at 407.
134 145 D.L.R.3d at 36.
135 Id
136 Id at 34.
137 Id. at 44-45; 5 D.L.R.4th at 385 145 D.L.R.3d at 37-38.
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eral legislative purpose.13 The federal government had no paramount
interest over offshore lands which justified federal property rights. The
federal government could meet its domestic and international obligations
without possessing property rights over offshore resources.
The federal government's ability to negotiate treaties did not estab-
lish federal property rights. Such a principle would be directly contrary
to the Labour Conventions case which held that the federal executive
had the sole power to negotiate treaties on behalf of Canada. 13 9 Treaties,
however, did not become incorporated into the law of Canada until they
were adopted and implemented by the appropriate legislature which was
determined by the nature of the subject matter. When the subject matter
was within the jurisdiction of the province, the province had to imple-
ment the treaty before it became binding on Canada. Similarly, if the
issue fell within federal jurisdiction, the appropriate legislature was the
Canadian Parliament.14
In the British Columbia Offshore Reference, the Supreme Court of
Canada ignored the distinction between treaty-making and treaty-imple-
mentation. The Supreme Court of Canada held that since the federal
government could sign the treaties regarding the territorial sea, the fed-
eral government had jurisdiction over the territorial sea off British Co-
lumbia.14 Ivan Head pointed out that the Court erred on this matter
138 In Reference Re Tax on Exported National Gas, June 23, 1982, at pp. 10-11, the Canadian
Supreme Court stated:
The full definition of expropriation or appropriation powers is beyond the scope of these
reasons. One has to bear in mind, however, in dealing with the arrogation of property
rights by federal authority in the exercise of some other right, that, whatever the terminol-
ogy may be, it is only such part of the property right and such extent of the taking of that
right, as may be tied inherently and of necessity to the exercise of the authority in question
by the federal level of government that the constitution will permit. Thus the Government
of Canada may not take or authorize the taking of property of the province beyond the
property absolutely essential to the Dominion undertaking. Mineral rights, for example,
would not be involved in appropriation of the site of the federal work. This is so both
because that part of the beneficial ownership of the province is not required by the fulfill-
ment of the federal undertaking; and, because the federal government may not take over a
source of revenue for its benefit in the course of establishing, under an express legislative
heading, a federal project or undertaking.
Id. at 44.
139 Attorney General Canada v. Attorney General Ontario, A.C. 326 (1937).
140 Arvay, Newfoundland Claim to Offshore Mineral Resources. An Overview of the Legal Is-
sues, 5 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 32, 39-40 (1979).
141 1967 S.C.R. 792 at 817, 65 D.L.R.2d 353 at 376. In the British Columbia Offshore Refer-
ence, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that:
the rights in the territorial sea arise by international law and depend on recognition by
other sovereign states. Legislative jurisdiction in relation to the lands in question belong to
Canada which is a sovereign states recognized by international law and thus able to enter
into arrangements with other states respecting the rights in the territorial sea.
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because "it failed to appreciate that 'the Crown in right of Canada' vis-a-
vis other nation states in the international community is a different legal
entity from 'the Crown in right of Canada' vis-a-vis the provinces in the
federal community."142 Since the Court's statement on this matter con-
travened the Labour Conventions case, Head concluded that the Cana-
dian Supreme Court "could surely not have intended this result" '143
External sovereignty was also the basis of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in the tidelands controversy. 1" In the first battle of the
United States conflict which involved jurisdiction over the submerged
lands off the coast of California, the United States Supreme Court held
that the federal government's sovereign interests in navigation, national
defense, international affairs and commerce established federal para-
mount rights over offshore lands beyond the low water mark.14 An im-
portant aspect of these paramount rights was dominion over the energy
resources located therein. 1"
The Supreme Court decision was wrong historically and confused
dominion and imperium. 1 7 Dominion refers to ownership, while impe-
rium refers to control.148 The federal government did have predomi-
nant sovereign interests in offshore lands, such as those enumerated, but
these rights could not be construed as claim of ownership. The Court
had never held that the power to regulate constituted a grant of title. 49
If the Court had established such a principle, the federal government
could claim title to all U.S. land. In addition, the Court had never held
that U.S. rights under international law served as the basis of property
rights between the federal and state governments. 150 The United States
Supreme Court, like the Supreme Court of Canada, confused property
rights, which are determined by domestic law, and sovereignty, which is
governed by international law.
Third, Newfoundland did not enter confederation on the "same
footing" as other provinces with respect to its natural resources.' l The
Canadian Constitution recognized that the provinces were unique in
many respects, including the ownership of natural resources. For exam-
142 Head, supra note 11, at 155.
143 Id. at 156.
144 Fitzgerald, supra note 1.
145 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
146 Id at 29-41.
147 Id at 43-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 43-45 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
149 See United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 388 (1918); see also, Corfield v. Cory-
ell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
150 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 209 U.S. 447 (1908); Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
572 (1823).
151 145 D.L.R.3d at 34.
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pie, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba were Canadian provinces for
many years before gaining control over their natural resources which had
been held by Canada. When these provinces attained control over their
resources in 1930, the separate agreements provided that the provinces
were to be placed in the same position as the original provinces. This
was accomplished by transferring to the provinces only those resources
within the provinces.' 2 If this had been the intent of the Newfoundland
Terms of Union, it could have easily been accomplished.
Canadian negotiators in 1947 were advised by the Deputy Minister
of Justice that if section 109 was to apply to Newfoundland, this had to
be expressly stated.'5 3 Canada had originally included language in the
Terms of Union with Newfoundland that was similar to that included in
the Prairie Provinces Agreements. On October 19, 1947, the Canadian
Cabinet approved the "Proposed Arrangements of the Entry of New-
foundland into the Confederation" which provided that Newfoundland
held rights over its natural resources "on the same basis as the other
provinces."' 15 4 These conditions were forwarded to the Governor of
Newfoundland, but this specific provision was deleted when the repre-
sentatives met after the referendum to settle the final terms of
confederation. 55
Newfoundland was not required to surrender control over its off-
shore resources to be on an equal footing with the other provinces when
it entered confederation. 56 Equality of treatment between the prov-
inces was not required under Term 3 of the Terms of the Union which
made the British North America Acts of 1867 through 1946 applicable
to Newfoundland unless "such provisions as are in terms are made or by
reasonable intendment may be held to be specifically applicable to or
only to affect one or more and not all the provinces originally united."' 57
Furthermore, the historical analysis by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the British Columbia Offshore Reference indicated that other provinces
with different historic claims to offshore areas may be on a different
footing.' 58
Newfoundland was the only Canadian province to enter confedera-
tion as a dominion. Newfoundland's status was similar to that of the
Republic of Texas when it joined the United States in 1845. From 1836
through 1845, Texas had been an independent republic with a three
152 Id
153 Id. at 35, (referring to Letter from F.P. Varcoc, Q.C., Deputy Minister of Justice to P.A.
Bridle, Acting Canadian High Commissioner to Newfoundland, July 5, 1947).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 145 D.L.R.3d at 34-36.
157 Id. at 35; see also 5 D.L.R.4th at 407 (quoting Term 3).
158 Factum of the Att'y Gen. of Nova Scotia, supra note 137, at 46-47; 145 D.L.R.3d at 20.
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marine league territorial sea. In 1950, in United States v. Texas, the
United States Supreme Court rejected Texas' claim that when it entered
the Union, it only surrendered its imperium, not its dominion over its
offshore lands.15 9 The Court offered a novel interpretation of the equal
footing clause.1" The Court acknowledged Texas imperium and domin-
ion over its offshore lands as a sovereign nation, but determined that
Texas relinquished its authority over offshore lands to the federal govern-
ment due to overriding concerns of national defense and international
affairs. 161 The Court held that the equal footing clause precluded the
extension of state sovereignty into the "domain of political and sovereign
power of the United States from which the other States have been ex-
cluded."1 62 Property rights had to be subordinated to political rights. 163
The United States Supreme Court was incorrect. When Texas was
admitted into the Union, it surrendered its imperium, not its dominion,
over offshore lands. This was manifested in the annexation agreement in
which Texas granted the United States only limited property for na-
tional defense and reserved for itself all "vacant and unappropriated
lands lying within its limits." 1 Furthermore, the equal footing clause,
which was not included in the Texas annexation agreement, did not re-
quire Texas to cede its property to the federal government. 16 The equal
footing clause addressed political and sovereign rights, not economic and
property rights.1 66 This was the first case in which the equal footing
clause was interpreted to deprive a state of "property that it had thereto-
fore owned." 167 The United States Supreme Court, like the Canadian
Supreme Court, erred by requiring the newly admitted state to relinquish
its jurisdiction over offshore areas to be on an equal footing with the
other states.
The United States soon abandoned the equal footing approach. In
1953 the Submerged Lands Act 168 was enacted which granted the coastal
159 339 U.S. 707, modified, 340 U.S. 907 (1950).
160 Id at 717. The equal footing clause appears in the Northwest Ordinance which dealt with
the admission of new states into the Union after independence. Article 5 of the Ordinance states,
"Whenever any of the said states shall have sixty-thousand free inhabitants, herein, such state shall
be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the
original states, in all respects whatsoever...." The equal footing clause appears in every enabling
statute admitting states into the Union except Texas. Comment, The Tidelands Oil Controversy, 10
DE PAUL. L. Rav. 116, 119 (1960).
161 339 U.S. at 717-20.
162 Id. at 719-20 (quoting Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 228-29 (1845)).
163 Id. at 717-20.
164 Id. at 722 (Reed, J., dissenting).
165 lig, Offshore Lands and Paramount Rights, 14 U. Prr. L. RPv. 10, 15-21 (1952).
166 339 U.S. at 722.
167 Id.
168 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1988).
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states jurisdiction over lands three miles or three marine leagues off-
shore. 69 The Supreme Court upheld the Act, stating that its prior deci-
sions had never asserted federal ownership over offshore submerged
lands, but only paramount rights over such lands.17 These paramount
rights were equivalent to a property right which Congress could legiti-
mately relinquish. Such a grant did not interfere with the U.S. sover-
eign interests. Furthermore, Congress could grant property to some
coastal states without awarding the same amount to all coastal states.171
The Court determined that jurisdiction over offshore lands was a
domestic dispute over the congressional disposition of property. Con-
gress could establish different boundaries for different coastal states be-
cause the equal footing clause referred only to political and sovereign
rights, not to property rights. Most importantly, the Court recognized
that dominion and imperium could be separated; thus, property rights
did not flow from sovereignty. This recognition implicitly repudiated
the paramount rights rationale relied upon by the United States
Supreme Court in the previous cases. 17 2
Fourth, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision that continental
shelf rights were not property rights confused property rights under
common law and constitutional law. Term 37 of the Terms of Union
referred to "property of" and "belonging to" Newfoundland. These
terms were not to be interpreted under the common law, but under con-
stitutional law to designate the beneficial use, control, management, and
disposition of property, subject to overriding national concerns. 173 In St.
Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen, the Privy Coun-
cil stated that
in construing these enactments (British North America Acts), it must
always be kept in view that wherever public land with its incidents is
described as 'the property of' or as 'belonging to' the Dominion or a
Province, these expressions merely import that the right to its benefi-
cial uses or its proceeds, has been appropriated to the Dominion or the
Province, as the case may be, and is subject to the control of its legis-
lature, the land itself being vested in the Crown.1 74
Prior to the British North America Act of 1867, all property was
held by the Crown either in right of the province, or in right of Great
Britain. Great Britain's right over offshore submerged lands was based
169 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1988).
170 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 274-76 (1954) (Reed, J., concurring).
171 Id.
172 Case Comment, Inability of Complainant States to Test the Validity of an Act Ceding Propri-
etary Rights in Submerged Lands to Coastal States: Alabama v. Texas, 34 B.U.L. REv. 504, 507
(1954).
173 145 D.L.R.3d at 18.
174 14 A.C. 46, 56 (P.C. 1888) (Ont.).
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on the "Crown's right to explore and exploit the great waste of the
sea." '175 This was a prerogative right of the Crown.176 Upon confedera-
tion in 1867, Crown proprietary prerogative rights were, for the most
part, granted to the provinces. 17 7 Canada was given broad law-making
authority, but limited ownership of property. Canada only received title
to the property which was transferred by sections 107 and 108 or by
paragraph 9 of the Third Schedule. The provinces retained "all lands,
mines, minerals and royalties" under section 109 and all undisposed of
property under section 117.178
Term 3 of the Terms of Union made the British North America
Acts applicable to Newfoundland. The Terms of Union only transferred
limited property to Canada, Newfoundland retained all of its unappro-
priated property under Term 35.179 Newfoundland also retained "all
lands, mines, minerals, and royalties" under Term 37. There was no im-
plied transfer of property from Newfoundland to Canada on the basis of
the nature of the Union, national defense, or international relations.
Terms 35 and 37 affirmed Newfoundland's property rights as they ex-
isted prior to confederation. Under the Terms of Union, Newfoundland
acquired all of the property which had been held by the Crown in right of
the province. It is necessary to examine the rights claimed by the Crown
and recognized by international law180 over the territorial sea and
the continental shelf to determine the offshore property, in a constitu-
tional sense, over which Newfoundland retained jurisdiction after
confederation.
VI. THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Due to the question posed in the Hibernia Reference, the Supreme
Court of Canada did not address the issue of federal-provincial jurisdic-
tion over the territorial sea. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal con-
fronted the issue and determined that prior to the commission
government "Newfoundland exercised dominion over the territorial sea
and its bed and subsoil."1 ' The territorial sea was "part of the territory
of Newfoundland and the rights in and over the solum belonged to New-
175 LA FOREST, NATURAL RESOURCES AND PUBLIC PROPERTY UNDER THE CANADIAN
CONSTITUTION, 106 (1969).
176 Id. at 79-83, 105-106.
177 Id. at 105-106.
178 Id.; see also, 145 D.L.R.3d at 44.
179 Term 35 states, "Newfoundland public works and property not transferred to Canada by or
under these Terms will remain the property of the Province of Newfoundland." Id at 218. LA
FOREST, supra note 175, at 218.
180 See infra note 336.
181 145 D.L.R.3d at 30.
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foundland."18 2  The Commission government did not "divest New-
foundland of any vested proprietary rights in the seabed of its maritime
belt, namely, its ownership of the territorial sea, its seabed and sub-
soil. 18 3 During the Commission government, Newfoundland acquired
"new rights in the submarine area contiguous to its coasts which might
be available under international law." '184 Consequently, the Newfound-
land Court of Appeal decided that "the sovereign rights to the bed and
subsoil of the territorial waters of Newfoundland that were vested in the
Crown in right of the Island of Newfoundland and its dependencies in
1949 remained vested in the Crown in right of the Province of New-
foundland after Confederation under the provisions of Term 37 of the
Terms of Union." '185 The Newfoundland Court of Appeal decision was
correct. 
186
A. British Recognition of the Territorial Sea
From the seventeenth century through the twentieth century, Eng-
lish jurists recognized that the Crown possessed jurisdiction and property
rights over the sea, seabed, and subsoil. 87 There was no distinction
between the Crown's imperium and dominion over offshore areas. 88 In
the nineteenth century, the Crown's offshore claims became focused on
the territorial sea.18 9
In the nineteenth century, Great Britain championed a three mile
territorial sea. This was manifested in international agreements and do-
182 Id.
183 Id. at 33.
184 Id
185 Id. at 36.
186 This decision was appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court which has not resolved the
issue. See Herman, The Newfoundland Offshore Mineral Rights References, An Imperfect Mingling
of International and Municipal Law, 1984 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 194, 202 n. 28.
187 For a complete overview of the development of the concept of the territorial sea, see
O'Connell, The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 303 (1971).
188 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 536 (1965).
189 The Crown's concern with the territorial sea did not constitute an abandonment of its
claims to seabed and subsoil minerals beyond the territorial sea. Fulton has asserted that sedentary
fisheries, as well as the mineral resources of the subsoil, were not subject to the narrow-limit rules
applicable to surface waters to the reasons therefore, but rather "require special treatment." I.
FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 612 (1911).
Such resources "have always been considered as on a different footing from fisheries for floating
fish. They may be very valuable, are generally restricted in extent, and are admittedly capable of
being exhausted or destroyed; and they are looked upon rather as belonging to the soil or bed of the
sea than to the sea itself." Id. at 679.
Lauterpacht has stated that "a State may acquire, for sedentary fisheries and for other purposes,
sovereignty and property in the surface of the seabed, provided that in so doing it in no way inter-
feres with freedom of navigation and with the breeding of free-swimming fish. 1 L. OPPENHIEM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 628-29 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955)[hereinafter Lauter-
pacht]. See also, Hurst, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea?, 4 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34 (1923).
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mestic legislation. 190 The Fisheries Convention of 1818, which settled
the United States-British conflict regarding fishing rights off Newfound-
land and Nova Scotia, barred U.S. fishermen from fishing three miles
from the shore of the Canadian provinces.19 In 1839, Britain and
France concluded a fishing agreement which precluded each from fishing
three miles from the other's shore. 192 In 1855, a U.S.-British claims
commission invalidated the British seizure of the U.S. schooner Wash-
ington in the Bay of Fundy on the grounds that the ship was on the high
seas, not within the three mile territorial sea of Nova Scotia. 193
Domestically, in 1868, British county courts were granted Admi-
ralty jurisdiction over maritime affairs occurring three miles from
shore.194 In 1876, Britain repealed all of its hovering legislation and es-
tablished a three marine league custom zone for British vessels and Brit-
ish citizens and a one marine league (3 mile) custom zone for foreign
vessels."'% In the nineteenth century, British publicists advocated a three
mile territorial sea.'9 6  Sir Robert Phillimore and Sir Edward Creasy
asserted that jurisdiction over the three mile territorial sea was based on
the cannon shot rule.' 97 Later, British publicists, such as Sir Travis
Twiss, William Edward Hall, and Thomas Joseph Lawrence accepted the
three mile rule on its merits, not as a function of the cannon shot rule.19 8
In the nineteenth century, British courts also accepted the three mile
territorial sea. In several early British cases, the Twee Gebroeders (1800)
and the Anna (1805), the British High Court of Admiralty acknowl-
edged the three mile territorial sea. 199 There were also statements in sev-
eral mid-nineteenth century British cases which recognized a three mile
territorial sea. In 1854, in Attorney General v. Chambers, the court dealt
with the ownership of coal seams which were contiguous to the sea-
shore.2" Lord Cranworth stated that, "the Crown is clearly in such a
case, according to all the authorities entitled to the littus maris (shore) as
well as to the soil of the sea itself adjoining the coasts of England."201
The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 dealt with "salvage arising in
the United Kingdom and with strandings "within the limits of the
190 S. SWARTZRAUBER, THE THREE MILE LIMaT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEAS 51-88 (1972).
191 Id. at 61-63.
192 Id at 65.
193 Id at 85.
194 Id. at 66-67.
195 Id at 70-71.
196 Id at 68-70.
197 Id. at 68-69.
198 Id. at 69.
199 Id at 60-61.
200 43 E.R 486, 489 (1854); see also, 1967 S.C.R. at 811, 65 D.L.R.2d at 370.
201 Id
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United Kingdom. '20 2 In 1856, in the Leda, Dr. Lushington stated that
the expression "the limits of the United Kingdom" includes waters
within 3 miles of shore. 2 °3
In 1858, the Cornwall Submarine Maine Arbitration involved a dis-
pute between the Crown and the Duchy of Cornwall concerning the
ownership of mines within the area three miles offshore. The arbitrator
held that the Duchy of Cornwall owned the mines to the low water
mark, while the mines beyond the low water mark were Crown prop-
erty.2°4 The arbitrator found that the Crown's right to the sea bed was a
"territorial right" and the seabed was "part of the Realm. 20 5
In 1860, in The General Iron Screw Collier Company, the court
dealt with the issue of whether the collision between a British and for-
eign ship within three miles of the coast of Great Britain was covered by
the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854.206 Sir Page Wood, stated that
"... every country may, by the common law of nations, legitimately exer-
cise jurisdiction over that portion of the high seas which lies within the
distance of three miles from it shores. ' 20 7
In 1861, Gammell v. Woods and Forest Commissioners, the court
had to decide whether the Crown held exclusive rights to the salmon
fishery off the coast of Scotland. 20 8 Lord Wensleydale stated that "it
would be hardly possible to extend fishing seaward beyond the distance
of three miles, which, by the acknowledged law of nations, belong to the
coast of the country-that which is under the dominion of the country by
being within cannon range-and so capable of being kept in perpetual
possession. "209
In 1865, in Gann v. Whitestable Free Fishers, the court held that the
holders of a Crown grant in the seabed could not collect tolls for
anchorage because their rights were subordinate to the public's right of
navigation which included anchorage.210 Ex-Lord Chancellor Chelm-
sford stated that, "[tihe three-mile limit depends upon a rule of interna-
tional law, by which every independent state is considered to have
territorial property and jurisdiction in the sea which washes their coast
202 Merchant Shipping Act 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 104, 458-60. See also O'Connell, supra note 187,
at 367.
203 S. SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 190, at 67.
204 1967 S.C.R. at 811, 65 D.L.R.2d at 370.
205 0. Connell, supra note 187, at 324; LA FORREST, supra note 175, at 94, 98. Hurst, supra
note 189, at 36.
206 S. SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 190, at 68.
207 Id.
208 3 McQueen's House of Lords Reports 419 (1859); see also British Columbia Offshore Ref-
erence, supra note 10, 65 D.L.R.2d at 371, 1967 S.C.R. at 812.
209 65 D.L.R.2d at 812.
210 11 H.L.C. 192, 218, 11 E.R. 1305, 1316 (1865).
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within an assumed distance of a cannon-shot from the shore. 21 1
The British courts, following Hale's doctrine,212 determined that the
Crown held property rights in the sea, seabed, and subsoil. D.P.
O'Connell noted that these cases affirmed that "all writers of the law of
England agree in this, that as the King is Lord of the Sea, that follows
around our coast, and also owner of all the land to which no individual
has acquired the right by occupation. ' 213 This position was also sup-
ported by thirty of the thirty-six writers who addressed the issue of the
territorial sea from 1836 through 1876.214 Consequently, until the later
part of the nineteenth century, the dominant view was that the Crown's
jurisdiction over the territorial sea was based on the Crown's proprietary
interests.
In 1876, in Regina v. Keyn, the Court of Crown Cases Reserved
broke with all prior precedent by refusing to acknowledge any Crown
rights, either proprietary or sovereign, in the territorial sea.215 In this
case, the German steamer, Franconia, ran into the British steamer, the
Strathclyde, two and a half miles off the English shore, killing a British
citizen. The captain of the Franconia, Fernindad Keyn, a German na-
tional, was convicted of manslaughter. His conviction was overturned by
a vote of 7-6 in the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. The Court held
that the Central Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted on the high seas by foreign nationals, even if the offenses were
committed within three miles of the English coast.216
The Court first examined the nature of the common law and admi-
ralty jurisdiction.217 The Court found that the criminal jurisdiction of
the common law courts was limited to the county, which included wa-
ters inter fauces terra,218 or to the realm, which ended at the low water
mark. Admiralty jurisdiction, which included offenses committed on the
seas outside of the realm, had been transferred to the county courts by
211 S. SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 190, at 67.
212 Hale stated that "In the sea the King of England hath a double right, viz. a right ofjurisdic-
tion which he ordinarily exerciseth by his admiral, and right of property or ownership." Supra note
187, at 362.
213 O'Connell supra note 187 at 365.
214 Id. at 327; see also Daniel, Sovereignty and Ownership in the Marginal Sea and Their Rela-
tion to Problems of the Continental Shelf, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 241, 267-311 (1951)(summary of Avail-
able Opinions of Jurists and Publicists-1670-1950).
215 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876).
216 Id.
217 This decision by Chief Justice Cockburn was joined by Justices Pollock and Field. Id. at
159-239.
218 According to the United States Supreme Court, "waters 'inter fauces terrae' or landward of
an opening 'between the jaws of the land' could be subject to the jurisdiction of the littoral county
rather than the Admiral if the jaws were close enough to satisfy a somewhat ambiguous line-of-sight
test." United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 92 (1986).
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statute. Since Keyn's offense occurred outside of all county boundaries,
the Crown had to demonstrate admiralty jurisdiction either over the na-
ture or location of the offense in order to legitimate the Central Court's
criminal jurisdiction.2 19
The Court, examining the nature of the offense, found that admi-
ralty jurisdiction, with the exception of piracy, was restricted to offenses
committed aboard British vessels which were considered an extension of
British territory. Since this crime was committed by a German national,
who was aboard a German ship, Admiralty lacked jurisdiction over the
type of offense.220
The Court, reviewing the location of the offense, rejected the posi-
tion earlier espoused by English jurists that the "bed of the sea is part of
the realm of England and part of the territorial possession of the
Crown."'22 1 Since there was no historic claim over the territorial sea, the
Crown's jurisdiction had to rest on received international law.222 The
Court acknowledged the emergence of the principle of the territorial sea
in international law, but noted that the publicists disagreed "in the prac-
tical application of the rule, in respect of the particular distance, and also
in the still more essential particular of the character and degree of sov-
ereignty and dominion to be exercised."223 In light of these uncertain-
ties, the Court was unwilling to accept the lowest common denominator
of the publicists regarding the territorial sea.224 The Court determined
that Britain could only exercise jurisdiction over the territorial sea
through an act of Parliament.225 Legislation pertaining to international
relations, customs, fisheries, and navigation were not sufficient.226 The
Court concluded that since Parliament never formally extended the
Crown's jurisdiction over the territorial sea, the Central Criminal Court
lacked jurisdiction to try Keyn for his offense.227
The minority accepted the proposition that international law was
the received law of England.228 The minority asserted that the concept
of the territorial sea in international law, which was established by the
"common agreement or acquiescence of jurists," enabled nations to ex-
ercise jurisdiction three miles seaward from their low water mark. This
219 2 Ex. D. at 161-62.
220 Id. at 168-69.
221 Id. at 195; see also, O'Connell, supra note 187, at 303-324.
222 McEvoy, Atlantic Canada: The Constitutional Offshore Regime, 8 DALHOUSIE L.J. 284,
292 (1984).
223 2 Ex. D. at 191.
224 McEvoy, supra note 222 at 292.
225 2 Ex. D. at 193, 203.
226 Id. at 214.
227 Id. at 230.
228 This is the decision by Justice Brett. Id. at 124-49. See also McEvoy supra note 222, at
297-98.
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three mile zone was "a part of the territory of the adjacent nation, as
much and as completely as if it were land a part of the territory of such
nation" and constituted the nation's "territorial waters, subject to its
rights of property, dominion and sovereignty."22 9 English criminal law
applied to the three mile zone even in the absence of a statute. Admi-
ralty jurisdiction, which was residual in nature, encompassed national
territory which was not part of the realm or the county. Since Keyn's
offense occurred within three miles of the English shore, Admiralty had
jurisdiction over the offense. Consequently, the Central Criminal Court,
as the successor of admiralty jurisdiction, had jurisdiction to try the
offense.2
30
In 1877, Keyn was reaffirmed in two reported cases. In the first
case, Harris v. Franconia, which involved three of the justices who were
in the minority in Keyn-Justices Coleridge, Grove, and Denman-the
Court decided that for jurisdictional purposes the territory of England
and the sovereignty of the Crown stopped at the low mark, unless ex-
tended by Parliament.231 In the second case, Blackwell Pier v. Fylde
Union, Justice Coleridge, joined by Justice Grove, found that a pier ex-
tending five hundred feet beyond the low water mark was outside of the
realm, thus not taxable.2 32 Both cases dealt with the geographical limits
of the common law courts, jurisdiction, not with the Crown's ownership
of such territory.
In 1878, Parliament responded to the Keyn decision. Judge John
Bassett Moore stated that Parliament "considered it imperative to adopt
legislation nullifying the decision's effect for the future besides declaring
it wrong as to the past. '2 33 Parliament enacted the Territorial Waters
Jurisdiction Act which restored the Crown's rights "as they always
existed. '2 34 Parliament extended Admiralty jurisdiction to all offenses
committed by foreigners on the territorial sea. Territorial waters were
defined as being one marine league seaward from the low water mark off
Great Britain and the British provinces. 235 Lord Coleridge, referring to
229 2 Ex. D. at 143.
230 Id. at 145-46.
231 2 C.P.D. 173, 46 L.J.Q.B. 363 (1877).
232 36 L.T. 251, 46 LJ.M.C. 189 (1877).
233 7 MOORE'S COLLECTED PAPERS 294, cited in Daniel, supra note 214, at 282.
234 Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, 41 & 42 Vict., ch. 73, preamble.
235 Territorial Waters were defined as
such a part of the sea adjacent to the coast of the United Kingdom, or the coast of some
other part of Her Majesty's dominions, as is deemed by international law to be within the
territorial sovereignty of Her Majesty; and for the purpose of any offence declared by this
Act to be within the jurisdiction of the Admiral, any part of the open sea within one
marine league of the coast measured from low-water mark shall be deemed to be open sea
within the territorial waters of Her Majesty's dominions.
McEvoy, supra note 222, at 297-98.
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the Act in Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, stated that "the opinion of the
minority in the Franconia case has been since not only enacted but de-
clared by Parliament to have been always the law. 236
The Keyn case, which was an anomaly, rested on a very narrow
basis. Keyn was only concerned with admiralty jurisdiction, not the
property rights over offshore lands. In 1890, the United States Supreme
Court in Manchester v. Massachusetts stated that in Keyn "the question
was not as the extent of the dominion of Great Britain over the open sea
adjacent to the coast, but only as to the extent of the existing jurisdiction
of the Court of Admiralty in England over offenses committed on the
open sea." 23 7 The United States Supreme Court proceeded to state that
"we think it must be regarded as established that, as between nations,
the minimum limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over tidewa-
ters is a marine league from its coast."23
D. P. O'Connell also found that the scope of Keyn was very lim-
ited.239 O'Connell asserted that the rationale of Keyn was that common
law jurisdiction was limited to the realm. The realm, which defined the
court's jurisdiction, included county waters and the areas to the low
water mark. The realm did not define the extent of the Crown's property
which was more than the sum of the counties. The territorial sea was
part of the Crown's lands, but not part of the realm.2" O'Connell stated
that "the true ratio decided in Regina v. Keyn was that the common law
jurisdiction terminated at the low water mark, and that nothing more fell
to be decided, although it is clear that the majority of the Court thought
they were deciding more."241
The British courts soon abandoned the Keyn rationale and returned
to a proprietary view of the territorial sea.242 Between 1891 and 1916,
there were statements in four cases which recognized the Crown's own-
ership of the seabed of the territorial sea. In 1891, in Lord Advocate v.
Clyde Navigation, the Court of Session decided that Clyde Navigation
could not dispose of dredgings in Long Loch because the Crown held
title to the seabed of the loch and to the seabed three miles from the
coast.24 3 The Court determined that "there is no distinction in legal
character between the Crown's right in the foreshore, in tidal and navi-
gable rivers, and in the bed of the sea within three miles of the shore." 244
236 14 Law Reports 273, 281 (Q.B. 1884).
237 139 U.S. 240, 257 (1891).
238 Id. at 258.
239 O'Connell, supra note 187, at 365-377.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 377.
242 LA FOREST, supra note 175, at 95.
243 19 Sess. Cas. (R.) 174, 177 (1891).
244 Id.
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The Crown held "a proprietary right-a right which may be the subject of
trespass, and which may be vindicated like other rights of property." 24 5
In 1900, in Lord Advocate v. Wemyss, the Court of Session decided
a dispute over the ownership of coal in the seabed beyond the low water
mark. 2" Lord Watson stated that, "I see no reason to doubt that, by the
law of Scotland, the solum underlying the waters of the ocean, whether
within the narrow seas, or from the coast outward to the three-mile limit,
and also the minerals beneath it, are vested in the Crown. 247
In 1908, in Lord Fitzhardinge v. Purcell, the court upheld a lord's
title to the foreshore of a navigable rivers, but found that the title was
subject to the public's right of fishing and navigation.24 Justice Parker,
commenting on the nature of the land, stated that "[c]learly the bed of
the sea, any rate for some distance, below low water mark and the beds
of tidal navigable rivers are, prima facie, vested in the Crown."249
In 1916, in Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Rao, the Privy
Council determined the ownership of three small islands which appeared
within three miles of the coast of Madras between 1840 and 1860.250 The
Board, quoting the statements in the aforementioned cases, held that is-
lands arising in the King's sea were the property of the King.251 The
Board, being very critical of Keyn, stated:
It should not be forgotten that Regina v. Keyn had reference on its
merits solely to the point as to the limits of Admiralty jurisdiction;
nothing else fell to be there decided. It was marked by an extreme
conflict of judicial opinion, and the judgment of the majority of the
Court was rested on the ground of there having been no jurisdiction in
former times in the Admiral to try offenses by foreigners on board
foreign ships whether within or without the limit of 3 miles from
shore.2
52
The Privy Council never formally resolved the issue of jurisdiction
over the territorial sea, even though it had such an opportunity in several
Canadian fisheries cases which had rejected the Keyn rationale.253 The
Board was reluctant to address the issue because the fishery disputes
could be decided separately. In the British Columbia Fisheries Reference
245 Id.
246 1900 App. Cas. 48.
247 Id. at 66.
248 24 T.L.R. 564 (1908).
249 Id. at 571.
250 32 T.L.R. 652, 652-53, (1916).
251 Id. at 655.
252 Id. at 653.
253 Attorney General of British Columbia v. Attorney General of Canada, 1914 A.C. 153
(B.C.) [hereinafter British Columbia Fisheries]; Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of
Quebec, 1921 A.C. 413 [hereinafter Quebec Fisheries Reference].
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in 1914, the Board found that the concept of the territorial sea was "still
in controversy." The Board asserted that the status of the territorial sea
should not be decided by a municipal tribunal, but should be deter-
mined by an international agreement.254 In the Quebec Fisheries Refer-
ence in 1921, the Board, reiterating its position, stated "[i]t is highly
inexpedient, in a controversy of a purely municipal character such as the
present, to express an opinion on what is really a question of public in-
ternational law." '255
Nevertheless, the Privy Council did infer that if rights in the territo-
rial sea were recognized the provinces would hold such rights.256 In the
Ontario Fisheries Reference in 1898, the Board determined that the
provinces retained all unappropriated lands which they possessed prior
to confederation.257 The province held title to the fisheries, but they re-
linquished jurisdiction over the fisheries to the Dominion of Canada
under section 91 of the BNA. 258 The surrender of legislative jurisdiction
did not imply any transfer of property interest.25 9 In the British Colum-
bia Fisheries Reference in 1914, the Board found that title to the fisheries
was based on the ownership of the solum. 26° In the Quebec Fisheries
Reference in 1921, the Board held that the Dominion of Canada had the
right to regulate fisheries, but it did not have any property interest in the
254 British Columbia Fisheries, supra note 253, at 174.
255 Quebec Fisheries Reference, supra note 253, at 431.
256 Roberts, Re Dominion Coal Col LTD." Constitutional Law-Property Rights in Solum of Can-
ada's Territorial Sea, 22 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 203, 207-09 (1964).
257 Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney Generals of Quebec, Ontario, and Nova Scotia,
1898 A.C. 700, 67 L.J.P.C. 90. In the Quebec Fisheries Reference in 1921, Lord Haldane, refer-
ring to the 1898 Fisheries Reference, stated:
What the Board on that occasion had to determine was, among other things, whether
the... rivers and other waters situate within the territorial limits of a Province and not
granted before confederation, belonged to the Crown in right of the Dominion or of the
Province. The answer was that generally speaking, the proprietary title to these beds, ex-
cepting where expressly transferred, remained provincial.
Quebec Fisheries Reference, supra note 253, at 419-420.
258 Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney Generals of Quebec, Ontario, and Nova Scotia,
supra note 257 at 712-13.
259 The Board stated that
it must also be born, in mind that there is a broad distinction between proprietary rights
and legislative jurisdiction. The fact that such jurisdiction in respect of a particular sub-
ject-matter is conferred on the Dominion Legislature, for example, affords no evidence that
any proprietary rights with respect to it were transferred to the Dominion. There is no
presumption that because legislative jurisdiction was vested in the Dominion Parliament
proprietary rights were transferred to it. The Dominion of Canada was called into exist-
ence by the British North America Act, 1867. Whatever proprietary rights were at the
time of passing of that Act possessed by the provinces remain vested in them except such as
are by any express enactments transferred to the Dominion of Canada.
Supra note 257, at 709-10.
260 British Columbia Fisheries Reference, supra note 253 at 163.
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solum which belongs to the Crown in right of the province. The Board
stated that "[t]he solum and the consequent proprietary title to the fish-
ery may be vested in the Crown in right of the Province or in a private
individual, and in so far as this is so, it cannot be transferred by regula-
tion."1261 These cases demonstrated that the provinces proprietary inter-
est in the fisheries was based on their proprietary interest in the bed of
the territorial sea which was held by the Crown in right of the provinces.
Politically, Britain continued to endorse a three mile territorial sea
after the Keyn decision. In 1882, Britain signed the North Sea Fisheries
Convention which recognized each of the signatories exclusive fishing
rights within their territorial seas.262 In 1883, Britain enacted the Sea
Fisheries Act which made it a criminal offense for foreign ships to fish
within Britain's three mile territorial sea.263 In 1893, Britain achieved a
victory in the Bering Sea Arbitration which concluded that the United
States had no rights over fur seals beyond its three mile territorial
sea.26 In 1905, Britain protested Uruguay's seizure of a Canadian ves-
sel, the Agnes G. Donohoe, beyond Uruguay's three mile territorial sea
and objected to Spain and Portugal's claims to six mile territorial seas.265
In 1911, an international convention settled the pelagic sealing contro-
versy which prohibited the signatories, including Britain, from hunting
sea otters beyond their three mile territorial seas.266 In 1912, the Inter-
national Court of Justice settled the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbi-
tration by recognizing the United States' and Great Britain's exclusive
fishing rights within their territorial seas.267 In 1927, in the case of the
Fagerness, a British Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction
over a maritime collision which occurred more than 3 miles outside of
Britain's territorial sea in the Bristol Channel.268
These judicial and political events caused a leading commentator,
Captain Swarztrauber, to conclude that:
It would seem that the greatest years for the three-mile limit were
those from 1876 to 1926, quite coincidentally exactly half a century.
The year 1876 brought Great Britain squarely in support of the three-
mile limit with the passage of the Customs Consolidation Act. After
that, the rule grew steadily and surely, overcoming virtually all oppo-
sition and competition. If domestic legislation, international instru-
ments, court decisions, and the writings of publicists are a fair
261 Quebec Fisheries Reference, supra note 253, at 428.
262 S. SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 190, at 85-86.
263 Id. at 67.
264 Im at 86-88.
265 Id. at 110-111.
266 Id. at 117-118.
267 Id. at 118-121.
268 Id. at 111-112.
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measure, then by 1926, the three-mile limit was in every sense a rule of
international law.269
The codification of international law regarding the territorial sea be-
gan in 1924 with a resolution of the League of Nations.270 The Hague
Codification Conference in 1930 recognized that coastal states possessed
full sovereignty over their maritime belts which included the super adja-
cent air, the seabed, and the subsoil.271 The conference did not produce a
treaty because there was no agreement regarding the width of the territo-
rial sea.272 Nevertheless, after 1930, most nations agreed that the sea
constituted part of a nation's territory under customary international
law.27 3 For example, in 1931, the Canadian Supreme Court, in S.S.
"May" v. the King, held that "it is a well recognized principle, both in
this country and in the United States that the jurisdiction of a nation is
exclusive and absolute within its own territory, of which its territorial
waters within three marine miles from shore are clearly a part as the
land. '2 74 The concept of the territorial sea, which was a principle of
customary international law, was codified in the Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea in 1958.275
B. Newfoundland's Territorial Sea
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Great Britain exercised
jurisdiction over Newfoundland's three mile territorial sea. The Crown's
rights over Newfoundland's territorial sea were held in right of the prov-
ince.z76  The provincial government of Newfoundland exercised juris-
diction over its territorial sea. In 1875, the Newfoundland Supreme
Court acknowledged Newfoundland's jurisdiction over its territorial sea
in Anglo-American Telegraph Company v. Direct United States Cable
Company.277  The Court granted an injunction preventing Direct U.S.
Cable from laying a cable to a buoy within Conception Bay which is on
the east coast of Newfoundland. The buoy and the cable were more
than three miles off the coast. The Court found that Direct U.S. Cable
had violated a Newfoundland statute which granted the exclusive
franchise to Anglo-American Telegraph to lay cable in Newfoundland.
The Court held that Newfoundland's jurisdiction extended three miles
269 Id. at 130.
270 145 D.L.R.3d at 21.
271 Id. at 22
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 3 D.L.R. 15, 20-21 (1931).
275 145 D.L.R.3d at 23. See generally Ereli, The Submerged Lands Act and the Geneva Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 41 TUL. L. Rav. 555 (1967).
276 145 D.L.R.3d at 24-25.
277 6 Nfld. L.R. 28 (1875).
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seaward from a closing line drawn across the mouth of Conception
Bay.2 7 Chief Justice Hoyles, recognizing provincial jurisdiction over the
territorial sea, stated that
I hold that the territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign extends to
three miles outside of a line drawn from headland to headland of the
bay.. .that the local government, being the Queen's government, rep-
resenting and exercising within the limits of the Governor's commis-
sion, which contains nothing restrictive upon this point, her authority
and jurisdiction is, in this respect, the same with the Imperial govern-
ment; that this authority and jurisdiction existed in the local govern-
ment prior to the grant of representative institutions to the colony;
that such grant, while it enlarged the powers, neither added to nor
lessened the territorial jurisdiction of the local government; and that,
subject to the royal instructions and the Queen's power of dissent, the
Acts of the local legislature have full effect and operation to the full
extent of that territorial jurisdiction.279
The Newfoundland Supreme Court reaffirmed Newfoundland's ju-
risdiction over the territorial sea in two subsequent cases. In 1888, in
Rhodes v. Fairweather, the Newfoundland Supreme Court invalidated a
Newfoundland statute which regulated the slaughtering of seals beyond
the three mile territorial sea.280 The Court, citing Direct U.S. Cable,
found that Newfoundland's jurisdiction only extended three miles from
its coast.281 Even Judge Pinsent, in dissent, stated that "I take it to be
sound doctrine as a general proposition that the limits of colonial juris-
diction extend only three miles from the shore. .... ,282 Following
Rhodes, the Colonial Office solicited an opinion from the Law Officers
regarding provincial jurisdiction over the territorial sea. The Law Of-
ficers responded that "we are of the opinion that, unless specifically au-
thorized by Imperial legislation, it is not within the power of Colonial
Legislature to legislate generally for the regulation of the fisheries
outside the three miles limit.
283
In 1889, in Queen v. Delephine, the Newfoundland Supreme Court
dealt with a conviction for the violation of the Newfoundland Bait Act
which occurred outside of the three mile territorial limit. 284  The New-
foundland Supreme Court, quoting Direct US. Sales, found that New-
foundland's jurisdiction was limited to three miles from shore.285 Justice
278 Id.
279 Id. at 33.
280 7 Nfld. L.R. 321 (1888).
281 Id. at 324-26.
282 Id. at 333.
283 Swan, The Newfoundland Offshore Claims: Interface of Constitutional Federalism and In-
ternational Law, 22 McGILL L.J. 541, 552 (1976).
284 7 Nfld. L.R. 378 (1889).
285 Id. at 385-86.
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Little stated that there was "no question as to the liability and amenabil-
ity of any foreign ships for offenses committed by the crews thereof
within the territorial waters of this colony.... -286
The provincial legislature continued to exercise jurisdiction over its
territorial sea. In 1893, Newfoundland enacted hovering legislation
which authorized provincial officials to board and examine the cargo
of foreign vessels hovering within three miles of the coast.28 7 In 1898,
Newfoundland passed a customs act which authorized inspections
within three miles of Newfoundland's coast.28 8 (Both the hovering and
customs acts referred to territorial waters as "British Waters"). In 1905
and 1906, Newfoundland promulgated Foreign Fishing Vessels Acts au-
thorizing provincial officials to board and inspect foreign fishing vessels
within Newfoundland's territorial sea.2 89 In 1907, Newfoundland en-
acted the Atlantic Steam Service Act, which granted subsea rights under
the Strait of Bell Isles, far beyond the three mile territorial sea, to build a
futuristic railroad.2 90 In 1916, Newfoundland passed the Oyster Fisher-
ies Act which authorized the issuance of leases on the banks which were
beyond the territorial sea.29 '
When Newfoundland achieved dominion status under the Balfour
Declaration in 1926, Newfoundland inherited all of the rights held by
the Crown for the province.2 92 Newfoundland also possessed sufficient
sovereignty to acquire any rights recognized by international law.2 93
Newfoundland's status in 1926 was analogous to that of Canada.2 94 In
the British Columbia Offshore Reference in 1967, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878 consti-
tuted a British claim of jurisdiction over the territorial sea for Canada.
Canada, however, only had limited jurisdiction over its territorial sea.
When Canada achieved its independence between 1919 and 1931, it was
entitled to all of the Crown's rights including those rights recognized by
international law.295 Consequently, in 1926, Newfoundland, like Can-
ada, possessed jurisdiction over its territorial sea.
Imperial legislation was not necessary to legitimate Newfoundland's
claim over its territorial sea.296 In Keyn, the court held that provincial
286 Id. at 86.
287 Swan, supra note 283, at 549; LA FOREST, supra note 175, at 101; 56 Vict., ch. 6. (Nfld.).
288 Customs Act, 61 Vict., ch. 13 (Nfld.).
289 An Act Respecting Foreign Fishing Vessels (1905) 5 Edw. VII, ch. 4, s. 1 (Nfld.); (1906)
6 Edw. VII, ch. I (Nfld.)
290 HERITAGE OF THE SEA, supra note 2, at 19.
291 Of the Propogation and Protection of Oysters, C.S.N. (1916), c. 165.
292 145 D.L.R.3d at 30.
293 Id. at 30-33.
294 145 D.L.R.3d at 26.
295 1967 S.C.R. at 815-17, 65 D.L.R. at 374-76.
296 Inions, supra note 125, 470 (1981).
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jurisdiction could only be extended by a formal act of Parliament.29 7
Nevertheless, by 1926, Keyn had been repudiated judicially and politi-
cally. Alternatively, if a formal legislative pronouncement was required,
the aforementioned enactments by Newfoundland, pertaining to hover-
ing, customs, and fishing, were the functional equivalent of a legislative
declaration, especially when viewed together with the Balfour
Declaration.298
Newfoundland continued to exercise jurisdiction over its territorial
sea after 1926. In 1929, Newfoundland enacted the Air Navigation Act
which regulated aerial navigation over Newfoundland and prohibited
aircraft from travelling over Newfoundland's territory, which included
the territorial sea.299 In 1930, Newfoundland enacted the Crown Lands
Act which provided for the licensing of offshore mining operations.3 °°
In 1930, Newfoundland amended its Customs Act and reaffirmed its ju-
risdiction over the territorial sea which was referred to as "Newfound-
land Waters., 30 1 Newfoundland's jurisdiction over its territorial sea was
again acknowledged in amendments to its Customs Act in 1933 and
1938.302
Dominion courts continued to ignore Keyn and recognize provin-
cial jurisdiction over the territorial sea. In 1932, in Rex v. Burt, the New
Brunswick Supreme Court upheld Captain Burt's conviction for the pos-
session of intoxicating liquor within the province, one and three quarters
miles off shore.30 3 Chief Justice Baxter found that the exercise of juris-
diction over the territorial sea "is now so generally admitted in interna-
tional law that I do not think that it is open to question that the
legislative authority of the Province extends over that area.. . .,,3 Jus-
tice Baxter proceeded to state that "Regina v. Keyn has been put to rest
so far as we are concerned by the judgment in Secretary of State v. Che-
likani Rama Rao.' 305 In 1934, the New Brunswick Supreme Court reaf-
firmed provincial jurisdiction over the territorial sea in Filion v. New
Brunswick International Paper Company.
306
Newfoundland did not surrender its rights over the territorial sea
during the Commission government. 30 7 Great Britain continued to rec-
297 The Queen v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, 193, 203, 214, 230 (1876).
298 Inios, supra note 125, at 469-70.
299 145 D.L.R.3d at 28-29.
300 Id. at 30.
301 Id.
302 Id at 30.
303 5 M.P.R. 112 (N.B. 1932).
304 Id. at 118.
305 Id. Justice Baxter stated that Keyn "had reference on its merits solely to the point of Admi-
ralty jurisdiction." IM. at 119.
306 8 M.P.R. 89, 118-19 (N.B. 1934).
307 145 D.L.R.3d at 33.
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ognize Newfoundland's rights to its natural resources. 30 8 When New-
foundland confederated with Canada in 1949, it retained rights over its
territorial sea under Term 37 of the Terms of Union.3 °9
There were several cases after confederation which resurrected the
rationale of Keyn. In 1956, the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court
followed Keyn in Gavin v. the Queen.31° In 1963, the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court in Re Dominion Coal Company Ltd. and County of Cape
Breton also based its decision on the rationale ofKeyn.311 Several justices
on the Nova Scotian Court engaged in the colloquium on the territorial
sea.312 Justice MacDonald, a proponent of Keyn, asserted that the Terri-
torial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878 simply reestablished criminal ju-
risdiction over the territorial sea, but did not incorporate the territorial
sea into the realm.313 Justice MacDonald, citing the United States
Supreme Court decisions in the tidelands controversy,314 questioned if
offshore property rights could ever be established in a federal system.315
Justice Currie, in dissent, pointed out the weakness in Justice MacDon-
ald's reliance on Keyn. Justice Currie held that Keyn was overruled by
the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878 and the Chelikani deci-
316sion. Justice Currie found that international law allowed a coastal
state to "exercise jurisdiction over its territorial waters at least up to
three miles., 317
The Supreme Court of Canada relied on Keyn in the British Colum-
bia Offshore Mineral Rights Reference.38  The Canadian Supreme
Court's decision in that case was erroneous for several reasons. First,
when British Columbia confederated with Canada in 1871, it did not sur-
render its rights over the territorial sea. British Columbia retained such
rights under section 109 or 117 of the British North America Act.31 9
Second, the rationale of Keyn, which was very narrow, was overruled by
subsequent judicial decisions and political action.320 Third, if Keyn were
valid, Canada would not have been entitled to exercise jurisdiction over
its territorial sea upon independence because the Imperial Parliament
308 Id.
309 Id. at 36.
310 3 D.L.R.2d 547 (1956).
311 40 D.L.R.2d 593 (1963).
312 Roberts, supra note 256, at 205-06.
313 Re Dominion Coal Company Ltd. and County of Cape Breton, 40 D.L.R.2d 630.
314 Fitzgerald, supra note 1.
315 40 D.L.R.2d, at 630-31.
316 Id. at 616-17.
317 Id. at 617.
318 See generally, British Columbia Offshore Reference, supra note 10.
319 5 D.L.R.4th at 408; see also supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
320 See supra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
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had not extended Canada's boundaries.3 2 ' Fourth, the federal govern-
ment's role as external sovereign did not expand its property rights under
the British North America Act.322 Finally, given the historical analysis
in the case, the Court's decision was restricted to the submerged lands
off the coast of British Columbia. 323
The High Court of Australia also addressed Keyn in New South
Wales v. Commonmwealth in 1975. 324  The Australian court upheld the
Sea and Submerged Lands Act of 1973 which declared the federal gov-
ernment's sovereignty over the territorial sea and, for the purposes of
exploration and exploitation of natural resources, over the continental
shelf.32 5 Several justices were critical of the Keyn rationale. Justice Ja-
cobs, in the majority, rejected the holding of Keyn that the Crown lacked
jurisdiction beyond the low water mark.326 Justice Jacobs found that the
Crown's dominion and imperium over offshore areas were not based on
the common law, but were prerogative rights of the King. Such preroga-
tive rights were recognized, but not limited, by the common law.327
These prerogative rights were transferred to Australia when Australia
achieved responsible government after World War J.328 Justice Jacobs'
rationale bolstered Newfoundland's jurisdictional claim. When New-
foundland achieved dominion status, Newfoundland became the heir to
all of the Crown's prerogative rights in the same manner as Australia.329
Two justices, in dissent, also questioned the Keyn decision. Justice Gibbs
321 The Queen v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, 193, 203, 214, 230 (1876).
322 See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
323 145 D.L.R.3d at 20; see also 5 D.L.R.4th at 407, and 131 A.L.R. 1.
324 135 C.L.R. 337, 345, 378, 421-36, 486 (1975).
325 Id. at 338; see also Harrison, Jurisdiction Over the Canadian Offshore: A Sea of Confu-
sion, 17 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 469, 474-79 (1979).
326 Justice Jacobs, referring to Keyn, stated that:
To describe it as a case concerned with the respective extents of jurisdiction of the common
law courts and the court of Admiralty is not to diminish the importance of the decision but
to emphasize its essential importance in the present context. The courts of common law
had no jurisdiction because the common law did not extend to regulate the rights and
obligations of persons beyond the boundaries of the counties.. .Whether or not the seas are
described as outside the realm depends not on the extent of the realm but on the meaning
given to the word, as I have earlier said, and in Reg. v. Keyn the question was the meaning
of that word in the Statutes of Richard II. It was not strictly necessary to decide in Reg. v.
Keyn whether the Crown of England owned the sea or any part thereof below low-water
mark and not intra fauces terrae. The important point was that the common law did not
extend there.
New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 491-92.
327 Justice Jacobs stated that: "[The royal right was a prerogative recognized by the com-
mon law and to that extent it was part of the common law but it did not have its source in that law.
His rights therein were not governed by the common law and the extent thereof was not deter-
mined by that law." Id. at 487.
328 Id. at 492-93.
329 145 D.L.R.3d at 26.
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stated that: "in my opinion it is apparent that the decision in Reg. v.
Keyn could have been reached without deciding whether the territory of
England stopped at low-water mark. ' 330 Justice Stephen pointed out
that the British Columbia Offshore Reference did not address the view of
Keyn set forth in the Chelikani case.3 31 Both justices determined that
the Keyn rationale did not negate the existence of the three mile territo-
rial sea. Consequently, the resurrection of Keyn in the cases following
confederation did not affect Newfoundland's rights over its territorial
sea.
VII. CONTINENTAL SHELF RIGHTS
The Supreme Court of Canada held that rights in the continental
shelf were not recognized as a principle of customary international law
when Newfoundland confederated with Canada.332 In 1949, different na-
tions made different claims regarding the basis and extent of their juris-
diction over the continental shelf. Since international law was in
transition, Newfoundland could not claim the rights to explore and ex-
ploit the resources of the continental shelf under international law.333
The Supreme Court of Canada also determined that the International
Court of Justice's (ICJ) decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases in 1969 did not make continental shelf rights retroactive to
1949.334 The International Court of Justice's finding that continental
shelf rights exist ipsojure and ab initio referred back to 1958 when the
Convention on the Continental Shelf was signed. In 1958, Canada, not
Newfoundland, was entitled to the rights over the continental shelf.335
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision was incorrect. In 1949, New-
foundland was entitled to continental shelf rights which were recognized
as a principle of customary international law. The Convention on the
Continental Shelf simply codified existing customary international law.
The International Court of Justice's decision in the North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf Cases supported Newfoundland's claim to rights over the conti-
nental shelf. The Court recognized that continental shelf rights were a
principle of customary international law until codified in the Convention
on the Continental Shelf. The Court determined that since a coastal
state's right over the continental shelf existed ipso facto, there was no
necessity for any occupation or a proclamation to assert rights over this
natural prolongation of national territory. Furthermore, the Court held
that since continental shelf rights existed ab initio, they were retroactive.
330 New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 395-96.
331 Id. at 437.
332 5 D.L.R.4th at 418.
333 Id. at 416.
334 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3.
335 5 D.L.R.4th 417-19.
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Consequently, Newfoundland possessed rights over its continental shelf
when it confederated with Canada in 1949.
A. Customary International Law
There are four sources of international law: 1) international conven-
tions, 2) international customs, 3) general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations, and 4) judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of various nations.336 Principles of cus-
tomary international law are established by a concordant practice by a
number of states, regarding an issue within the domain of international
relations, over a considerable period of time, upon the belief that the
practice is required by international law. There must also be general
acquiescence to the practice by other states.337 Zdenek Slouka stated
that international customary law
originates in national policies manifested in the conduct of states; and
on the fact, secondly, that their growth is evolutionary. Combined,
these two facts imply that the growth of customary rules is a practice
through which political discretion of states gradually narrows down
into progressively restrictive, unavoidable, and finally obligatory
patterns.338
The first act recognizing jurisdiction over the continental shelf was
the Treaty Relating to the Submarine Areas Off the Gulf of Paria in
1942. 339 In this treaty, Great Britain and Venezuela acknowledged each
others sovereignty and control over the submerged areas in the Gulf of
Paria which separated Venezuela and Trinidad. The treaty did not refer
to the continental shelf specifically, nor claim any rights to the seabed
resources. Following the treaty, Great Britain annexed the submerged
lands off Trinidad and Tobago and claimed exclusive rights to exploit
the resources on the continental shelf. Great Britain's annexation was
based on the theory that the submerged lands beyond the low water
mark were res nuius and could be appropriated by occupation. 3 ° The
British practice did not foreshadow the development of international law
regarding the continental shelf.
The development of the modern view regarding the continental shelf
began with the Truman Proclamation on September 28, 1945. The
United States claimed exclusive jurisdiction and control over the natural
336 The sources of international law are set out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. 1947-1948 U.N.Y.B. 1000, U.N. Sales No. 1949.1.13. See also 5 D.L.R.4th
at 411 (referring to the Article 38(1) sources).
337 O'Connell, supra note 188, at 17.
338 Z. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, A STUDY IN
THE DYNAMICS OF CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1968).
339 5 D.L.R.4th at 411-12.
340 Id.
1991]
CASE W. RES. J INT'L L.
resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf.341 The Tru-
man Proclamation asserted that coastal nation's have jurisdiction over
their continental shelf resources because 1) the continental shelf was an
extension of the coastal state's land mass, thus naturally appurtenant to
it; 2) the cooperation of the coastal state was necessary for the utilization
and conservation of offshore resources; 3) continental shelf resources
were often commingled with the resources of the land territory; and 4)
national defense precluded one nation from developing continental shelf
resources off another nation's shore.342 The Truman Proclamation
stated
having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing
its natural resources, the Government of the United States regards the
natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf be-
neath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as
appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control.343
Following the Truman Proclamation, other nations declared juris-
diction over the continental shelf. Prior to Newfoundland's confedera-
tion with Canada in 1949, 7 nations and 2 colonies issued proclamations
claiming jurisdiction over their continental shelves.3 " Several Latin
American nations issued decrees which declared rights over the conti-
nental shelf and its super adjacent waters to a far greater extent than that
asserted in the Truman Proclamation. 345 The United States and Great
Britain protested these claims.346
When Newfoundland confederated with Canada in 1949, conti-
nental shelf rights were recognized as a principle of customary interna-
341 The Truman Proclamation is set out in full in British Columbia Offshore Reference, supra
note 10, 1967 S.C.R. at 818-19, 65 D.L.R.2d at 377; see also Hollick, U.S. Oceans Policy: The Tru-
man Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23 (1976).
342 The Truman Proclamation states that
Whereas it is the view of the Government of the United States that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf by the
contiguous nation is reasonable and just, since the effectiveness of measures to utilize or
conserve these resources would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from the
shore, since the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land mass of the
coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it, since these resources frequently form a
seaward extension of a pool or deposit lying within the territory, and since self-protection
compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of the
nature necessary for utilization of these resources.
65 D.L.R.2d at 377.
343 5 D.L.R.4th at 412.
344 Id. at 412-13; See also Holland, the Jurisdictional States of the Continental Shelf, 30 TEXAs
L. REV. 586, 591-94 (1952).
345 Lauterpacht, supra note 189, at 632 nn. 1 & 2. In 1951, the United States protested claims
by El Salvador, Ecuador, and Honduras.
346 Lauterpacht, supra note 189, at 632 n. 4.
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tional law. According to Hersch Lauterpacht, a noted international
scholar and former justice on the International Court of Justice, the
length of time for a practice to evolve into a principle of customary in-
ternational law is irrelevant.347 Custom is not another expression for
prescription. A consistent and uniform practice can occur in a short
period of time. The length of time necessary for the crystallization of
custom is proportionate to the degree and intensity of the change which
the custom purports to accomplish. Since the recognition of continental
shelf rights did not constitute a drastic change in international law, there
was no necessity for a prolonged period of time to establish such rights as
a rule of customary international law.348
Lauterpacht also pointed out that the status of the nations institut-
ing a change in international law is important.
349
The recognition of continental shelf rights by the United States and
Great Britain was significant because both nations, who were the leading
maritime powers, were strong supporters of freedom of the seas and re-
strictive claims regarding the territorial sea. The United States and
Great Britain's acceptance of continental shelf rights was strong evidence
of the emergence of new principle of customary international law. 350The basis of this new principle of customary international law was
geographical unity and contiguity.351 Both of these factors corresponded
to the physical reality. The continental shelf could be viewed as 1) the
extension of the continental land mass, 2) the result of accretion from or
accession to the coastal nation's land mass, or 3) an area of the coastal
nation which was experiencing marine transgression.352 Furthermore,
the principle of contiguity as the basis of a nation's claim over offshore
areas had been recognized in international law. In the Grisbadarna case
in 1909, the Permanent Court of Arbitration held that "in conformity
with the fundamental principles of the law of nations, both ancient and
modern..., the maritime territory is an essential appurtenance of land
territory. '35 3 Hersch Lauterpacht asserted that contiguity, which rests
upon geographical unity, "provides a legal basis of utility and reasona-
bleness which is most consistent with the technical realities of the situa-
tion, with security of the states, and with the requirement of international
stability. ' 354 D.P. O'Connell, concurring with Lauterpacht's position,
pointed out that "economic necessity... is the generating impulse of the
347 Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRrr. Y. B. INT'L L. 376, 393 (1950).
348 Id.; see also Holland, supra note 345, at 597.
349 Id. at 394.
350 Id. at 394-395.
351 Id. at 423.
352 Id at 430-31.
353 Norway-Sweden Boundary Dispute, 4 AM. J. I1T'L LAW 226, 231 (1910).
354 Lauterpacht, supra note 347, at 431.
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(continental shelf) doctrine, and contiguity is relied on as the test for
establishing the limits within which economic considerations will be per-
mitted to operate. 355
The modem doctrine of continental shelf rights was not based on
occupation.356 Offshore submerged lands could not be occupied in the
same manner as land territory. International law had moved away from
occupation as the basis of title. This was manifested in the Clipperton
Arbitration in 193 13" and the Eastern Greenland Arbitration in
1933.358 In both cases, a proclamation of sovereignty and minimal acts
over the territory were accepted as sufficient to demonstrate sover-
eignty. 35 9 Both decisions prompted von der Heydte to state, "these two
cases seem to suggest that the appearance of a sovereign authority in
an uninhabited region involved acquisition of that territory. ' ' 36° There
was no need for a nation to issue a proclamation in order to claim conti-
nental shelf rights. Lauterpacht asserted that proclamations were not "a
source of title or a means of acquiring it."' 361 Continental shelf proclama-
tions were declarative, not constitutive, of continental shelf rights. Since
continental shelf rights arose by right under international law, nations
could issue proclamations at their discretion. 62 Consequently, New-
foundland's failure to issue a continental shelf proclamation did not af-
fect its rights.363
There was general international acquiescence to national claims
over the continental shelf. According to Lauterpacht, the lack of protest
"may be fairly interpreted as meaning that they accepted it as law, i.e., as
being in conformity with the existing law. ' , 36' Furthermore, the absence
of a protest acted as an estoppel regarding future objections to the princi-
ple of continental shelf rights. 365 Nations had a duty to voice their objec-
355 Supra note 188, at 577-78.
356 Lauterpacht, supra note 347, at 415-23.
357 Clipperton Arbitration, Annual Digest, 1931-32, Case No. 50; see also Lauterpacht, supra
note 347, at 415-23.
358 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 53, at 45-46
(Apr. 5, 1933); see also Lauterpacht, supra note 347, at 415-23.
359 Lauterpacht supra note 347, at 415-23.
360 O'CONNELL, supra note 188, at 475.
361 Lauterpacht, supra note 347, at 418.
362 Id. at 394.
363 The Newfoundland Court of Appeal reaching a contrary conclusion stated:
The Supreme Court of Canada in the British Columbia Reference determined that interna-
tional law cannot, of itself, endow a State with additional territory or rights therein. The
acquisition of such rights is a matter of municipal law and must be accomplished by some
constitutional act. We must, of course, accept that decision as determinative of the issue.
The historical record of Newfoundland prior to Union establishes there was no such act.
145 D.L.R.3d at 40.
364 Lauterpacht, supra note 347, at 395.
365 Id. at 397. Lauterpacht has stated that:
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tions if they felt the continental shelf claim violated international law.
Otherwise, the nation making the claim could rely on their acquiescence
and plan for the development of continental shelf resources.366
Canada never protested the emergence of continental shelf rights.367
Prior to the issuance of the Truman Proclamation, the United States con-
sulted with those governments "whose interests may be concerned and
whose concurrence is desirable, namely, Canada, Newfoundland, Mex-
ico, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and Cuba."36 After being consulted,
neither Canada, nor Newfoundland raised any objections to the Truman
Proclamation. Canada advised the United States that its silence should
not be interpreted as disapproval.369 If Canada had believed that the
Truman Proclamation violated existing international law, it should have
registered its protest. Canada's failure to protest precluded its claim that
at the time of confederation the Crown did not hold rights in the conti-
nental shelf for the province of Newfoundland.
Within six months after confederation, thirteen additional states as-
serted claims over the continental shelf. In the Middle East, nine Sheik-
doms issued proclamations over the continental shelf which never
mentioned boundary extensions. Since these proclamations were drafted
by the British Foreign Office, they indicated a change in the British posi-
tion regarding the necessity of occupation to gain continental shelf
rights.3 70 By the end of 1950, eighteen nations had asserted claims over
the continental shelf.3 7 1
There was a great deal of controversy regarding the status of conti-
nental shelf rights under international law. In 1950, the International
Law Association issued a report which recommended that "control and
jurisdiction" over the continental shelf should "vest ipso jure in the
coastal state, or vest in the coastal state (without effective occupation
being necessary) by national occupation (e.g. by proclamation) by that
Protest is a formal communication from one State to another that it objects to an act
performed, or contemplated, by the latter. A protest serves the purpose of preservation of
rights, or of making it known that the protesting State does not acquiesce in, and does not
recognize, certain acts. A State can lodge a protest with another State against acts which
have been notified to the protesting State, or which have otherwise become known. On the
other hand, if a State acquires knowledge of an act which it considers internationally illegal
and in violation of its rights, and nevertheless does not protest, this attitude implies a
renunciation of such rights, provided that a protest would have been necessary to preserve
a claim.
Lauterpacht, supra note 189, at 874-75.
366 let; see also Lauterpacht, supra note 347, at 397.
367 Lauterpacht, supra note 189.
368 145 D.L.R.3d at 32.
369 5 D.L.R. 4th at 23.
370 Id at 21.
371 Lauterpacht, supra note 347, at 381-82; see also Z. SLOUKA, supra note 338, at 56.
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state., 3 7 2 The report, evidencing the dispute regarding the status of con-
tinental shelf rights, concluded that "whatever view one takes on the
question whether the above mentioned state practice has, as yet crystal-
lized into a rule of positive law, it is evident that the clarification of this
question by international agreement is very desirable. 373
In 1950, the International Law Commission (ILC), a United Na-
tions organization which provides advice to the General Assembly for
"the progressive development and codification of international law," be-
gan work on the development of continental shelf rights.3 74 At the ILC
meeting in 1950, J.M. Yepes of Bogota asserted that the Truman Proc-
lamation "constitutes a veritable customary law to which the Commis-
sion should give recognition., 375 In 1951, the ILC submitted seven draft
articles which reflected its view of the status of international law regard-
ing the continental shelf.3 76 The ILC did not support the position that
continental shelf rights were recognized as a principle of customary inter-
national law.377
In 1951, Lord Asquith's decision in the Matter of an Arbitration
between the Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited and His
Excellency Sheik Shakhbut Bin Sultan Bin Za'id, Ruler of Abu Dhabi
and its Dependencies provided some insight into the status of continen-
tal shelf rights.37 8 In 1939, the Sheik of Abu Dhabi entered into an
agreement with Petroleum Development Limited, a member of the Iraq
Petroleum Company, granting the company the exclusive rights to de-
velop and export oil from Abu Dhabi. In June 1949, the Trucial Sheik-
doms and a number of Mideastern states declared their jurisdiction and
control over "the seabed and subsoil lying beneath the high seas in the
Persian Gulf contiguous to the territorial waters of Abu Dhabi and ex-
tending seaward to boundaries to be determined more precisely as the
372 J.P.R. Reith, Rights to the Seabed and its Subsoil, ILA Digest, 87, 132, 44th Conference
(1950).
373 Id.
374 5 D.L.R. 4th at 26.
375 Z. SLOUKA, supra note 338 at 20-21 (citing U.N. International Law Commission, Yearbook
1950, vol. 1, p. 218).
376 Holland, supra note 344, at 595.
377 The ILC stated that
The Commission has not attempted to base on customary law the right of a coastal State
to exercise control and jurisdiction for the limited purposes stated in Article 2. Though
numerous proclamations have been issued over the past decade, it can hardly be said that
such unilateral action has already established new customary law. It is sufficient to say
that the principle of the continental shelf is based on general principles of law which serve
the present day needs of the international community.
5 D.L.R. 4th at 28.
378 1 INT'L. & AND COMp. L.Q. 247 (1952); see also Cosford, The Continental Shelf and the
Abu Dhabi Award, 1 MCGILL L.J. 109 (1953).
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occasion arises."379 Following the proclamation, the Sheik transferred
the rights to develop and export oil from the newly acquired offshore
lands to Superior Oil of California. A conflict ensued when Petroleum
Development Limited asserted that the Sheik had transferred such
rights to Petroleum Development in 1939. Under terms of the contract,
the issue was submitted to arbitration.380
Lord Asquith, the arbitrator, determined that the rights which the
Sheik granted in 1939 were confined to the area landward of and includ-
ing the territorial sea.381  There was no recognition of continental shelf
rights in 1939. Such rights were of recent origin. Lord Asquith main-
tained that the draft articles of the ILC in 1951 were not declarations of
existing international law, but proposals for future principles of interna-
tional law. Since different nations were making diverse claims to the
resources below, on, and above the continental shelf to different dis-
tances, Lord Asquith determined that continental shelf rights did not
exist ipso jure in 1950. Lord Asquith stated that
there are in this field so many ragged ends and unfilled blanks, so
much that is merely tentative and exploratory, that in no form can the
doctrine claim as yet to have assumed hitherto the hard lineaments or
the definitive status of an established rule of international law.
382
Lord Asquith determined that even though continental shelf rights
were not yet recognized by international law, international principles
supporting continental shelf rights should be developed. Such principles
should rest on the doctrine of contiguity.
38 3
Lord Asquith was mistaken regarding the nature of continental shelf
rights in international law. D.P. O'Connell pointed out that a principle
379 Id. at 255.
380 Id.
381 Id.
382 Id. at 256.
383 Lord Asquith stated that:
Whether there ought to exist a rule giving effect to the doctrine in one form or another and,
if so, which of its forms is another question and one which, if I had to answer it, I should
answer in the affirmative. There seems to be much cogency in the arguments of those who
advocate the ipso jure variant of the doctrine. In particular: 1) it is extremely desirable
that someone, in what threatens to become an oil starved world, would have the right to
exploit the subsoil of the submarine bed outside the territorial limit; 2) the contiguous
coastal power seems to be the most appropriate and convenient agency for this purpose.
It is in the best position to exercise effective control, and the alternative is teemed with
disadvantages; 3) there is no reason in principle why the subsoil of the high seas should,
like the high seas themselves, be incapable of being subject of exclusive rights to any-
one.. .4) to treat this subsoil as res nullius, fair game for the first occupier, entails obvious
and grave dangers so far as occupation is possible at all. The doctrine that occupation is
vital in the case of areas res nullius has in any case worn thin since the East Greenland
Arbitration and more especially since that relating to Clipperton Island.
Id. at 256.
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of international law "may be vague as to extent and application, but that
is not to conclude, as Lord Asquith did, that it lacks judicial charac-
ter. '384 O'Connell asserted that principles of international law begin as
the inchoate practices of states which are later given judicial construc-
tion.385 According to O'Connell "when it is observed that some thirty
nations have claimed their continental shelves, including the major Pow-
ers with a preponderant interest in both freedom of the seas and the pro-
tection of coastal resources, it is legitimate to assert that the continental
shelf concept is one of law.",386
The International Law Commission (ILC) continued its work on the
development of continental shelf rights. In 1953, the ILC stated that
"the practice itself is considered by the commission to be supported by
consideration of legal principles and convenience. ' 387 By 1956, the ILC
ceased to designate whether its proposed rules involved the progressive
development (i.e. lexferenda) or the codification (i.e. lex lata) of interna-
tional law.388 In its final report, the ILC supported international recog-
nition of continental shelf rights.389
The work of the ILC pertaining to continental shelf rights
culminated at the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva in 1958. Many
of the delegates attending the Conference did not view their role as in-
volving the progressive development of international law, but the codifi-
cation of existing international law.390 At the conference, there was
controversy over the status of continental shelf rights. Of the 55 dele-
gations which participated in the debates of Committee IV regarding
384 O'CONNELL supra note 188, at 577.
385 Id.
386 Id
387 Oda, A Reconsideration of Continental Shelf Doctrine, 32 TuLANE L. REv. 27, 30, n. 31
(referring to UN Doc. No. A/2456 at 14).
388 Goldie, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Ray of Hope for the International Court, 16
N.Y.L.F. 327, 337-38 (1970).
389 The ILC stated that continental shelf rights were
supported by considerations of law and of fact. In particular, once the seabed and subsoil
have become an object of active interest to coastal states with a view to the exploration and
exploitation of their resources, they cannot be considered res nullius, i.e. capable of being
appropriated by the first occupier. It is natural that coastal States should resist any such
solution. Moreover, in most cases the effective exploitation of natural resources must pre-
suppose the existence of installation on the territory of the coastal State. Neither is it
possible to disregard the geographical phenomenon whatever the term - propinquity, conti-
guity, geographical continuity, appurtenance or identity-used to define the relationship
between the submarine areas in question and the adjacent non-submerged land. All these
considerations of general utility provide a sufficient basis of the principle of sovereign rights
of the coastal State as now formulated by the Commission. As already stated, that princi-
ple which is based on general principles corresponding to the present needs of the interna-
tional community, is in no way incompatible with the principle of freedom of the seas.
Factum of the Attorney General of Canada, supra note 103, at 28.
390 Supra note 388, at 347-48.
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continental shelf rights, 20 nations asserted that continental shelf rights
were recognized by customary international law, 12 states denied the
existence of such rights, and 23 states expressed no opinion on the
issue.391
Proponents of the existence of continental shelf rights based their
support on different grounds. The Yugoslav delegate asserted that conti-
nental shelf rights were established by the publication by 30 states of
"unilateral declarations extending their sovereignty to submarine areas
beyond the limits of the territorial sea" which "was not contested."3 92
The Yugoslavian delegate "did not oppose the formal and collective rec-
ognition of what was already an established institution. ' 393 The delegate
from the United Kingdom stated that "the rules of international law on
the continental shelf were mainly the results of unilateral declarations,
such as President Truman's proclamation in 1945." 394 The Australian
delegation asserted that continental shelf rights were established by "cus-
tom initiated by the leading maritime powers and acquiesced in by the
generality of States. '395 The Argentine representative declared that "the
principle instrument affecting the continental shelf, President Truman's
Proclamation 1945, and its acceptance by other States had given rise to a
practice which, though based on unilateral acts, had acquired the validity
of a principle of international law." 39
6
The Israel delegate declared that the recognition of continental
shelf rights as a principle of international customary law was supported
by "the existence of a sufficient body of State practice, widespread acqui-
escence in that State practice, the large volume of authoritative literature
and the work done by the ILC and the General Assembly on the sub-
ject. . ,,397 The Philippine delegate stated that continental shelf rights
were "inherent in the sovereignty which the coastal State exercised over
the adjacent land territory" and were not derived "from any specific pro-
vision of international law."' 39' The Mexican delegate asserted that
coastal states had exclusive control over the continental shelf because it
was "an integral part of the mainland." 399
The Conference drafted the Convention on the Continental Shelf
which codified the existing customary international law.' The Conven-
391 Z. SLOUKA, supra note 338, at 91.
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 Id at 91-92.
397 Id. at 92.
398 Id. at 93.
399 Id
400 145 D.L.R.3d at 40.
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tion declared that coastal states have exclusive rights to explore and ex-
ploit the natural resources of the continental shelf adjacent to their
coasts." 1 Such rights exist ipso jure, by right of law, thus there is no
need for a proclamation or occupation. Continental shelf rights do not
affect the status of the super adjacent waters. The exploration and ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf must not inter-
fere with navigation, fishing, scientific research, or the conservation of
living resources. The Convention was signed by 46 states. By the sum-
mer of 1964, 22 states had ratified or acceded to the Convention.' 2
B. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
Judicial decisions constitute an important source of international
law4°3 and play a significant role "in the crystallization of custom."'
The International Court of Justice is instrumental in interpreting and
establishing principles of international law. D.P. O'Connell stated that
pronouncements by the International Court "form the living law and
fuse with diplomatic practice to produce a rule governing the reflections
of authors, the opinions of governmental legal advisers, and the deci-
sions of other judges. ' '405
The coasts of Germany, Denmark, and Norway are adjacent to the
North Sea. Agreements delimiting the continental shelf in the North Sea
were negotiated between Great Britain and Germany, Denmark, and
Norway. These agreements were based on the equidistance principle of
Article Six of the Convention on the Continental Shelf which provides
that a median line be drawn, separating the countries, with all points on
the line being equidistant from the shores of the opposite countries. 4 6
401 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 52 AM. J. INT. L. 858 (1958).
402 Z. SLOUKA, supra note 338, at 90.
403 See e.g. 5 D.L.R.4th at 385.
404 O'CONNELL supra note 188, at 30.
405 Id.
406 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 316. Art. 6 provides as follows:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States
whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to
such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement,
and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is
the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States,
the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In
the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circum-
stance, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each
State is measured.
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are drawn in
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Denmark, Germany, and Norway, then, had to determine their lateral
continental shelf boundaries. When negotiations were unsuccessful, they
referred the issue to the International Court of Justice.'
Denmark and Norway, both signatories of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, asserted that the equidistance principle of Article Six
should be utilized to establish offshore boundaries because the Conven-
tion was binding under international law."° West Germany, a non-sig-
natory of the Convention, alleged that the Convention was not binding
as international law and continental shelf rights were not recognized as a
principle of customary international law. West Germany asserted that
the continental shelf should be delimited on the basis of a "just and equi-
table share" which required a proportional sharing of the continental
shelf based on the length of a nation's coastline or on the extent of its sea
frontage.40 9
The International Court of Justice, by a vote of eleven to six, re-
jected both assertions.41 0 The Court found that only Articles One, Two
and Three, not Article Six, were binding as principles of international
law. The Court stated that
Article 12 of the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention.. .permits res-
ervations to be made to all the articles of the Convention other than to
Articles 1 to 3 inclusive-these three articles being the ones which, it is
clear, were then regarded as reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or
at least emergent rules of customary international law relative to the
continental shelf.4
11
The Court rejected Norway's and Denmark's claims that Article Six
was binding as a principle of customary international law. The Court
found that since the actions of West Germany were not indicative either
of an acceptance or rejection of the Convention, Germany could not be
bound by the equidistance principle.412
The Court also rejected West Germany's "just and equitable" ap-
proach, declaring that marine boundary delimitation "is a process which
accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should be de-
fined with reference to charts and geographical features as they exist at a particular date,
and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable points on the land.
407 The question presented to the ICY was: "What principles and rules of international law are
applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the
North Sea which appertains to each of them beyond the partial boundary determined by the above
mentioned Convention of 9 June 1965?" Nordquist, The Legal Status ofArticles 1-3 of the Continen-
tal Shelf Convention According to the North Sea Cases, 1 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 60, 63 (1970).
408 Id at 64-65; see also Murray, A Discussion of the World Court's North Sea Judgment, 19
AM. U. L. REV. 470, 471 (1970).
409 Nordquist, supra note 407, at 64-65.
410 Id. at 63, n. 12.
411 Id at 67-68; 1969 I.C.J. 39.
412 Id at 65.
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involves establishing the boundaries of an area already, in principle, ap-
pertaining to the coastal state and not the determination de novo of such
an area. 4 13 The Court recognized that each nation's continental shelf
existed by right under international law. The Court's only duty was to
decide the basis for drawing the boundary lines.414 Nevertheless, the
Court did arrive at a formula which was more beneficial to West Ger-
many. The Court asserted that delimitation of the continental shelf
should be accomplished by equitable agreements which consider "all the
relevant circumstances" and grants "to each Party all those parts of the
continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land terri-
tory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural pro-
longation of the land territory of the other. '41 5
The International Court of Justice's decision in the North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf Cases was significant to Newfoundland's claims for sev-
eral reasons. First, the Court recognized that the continental shelf was
the natural extension of a nation's territory. The Court stated,
"[w]hat confers the ipsojure title which international law attributes to
the coastal State in respect of its continental shelf, is the fact that the
submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the
territory over which the coastal State already has dominion,-in the
sense that, although covered with water, they are a prolongation or
continuation of that territory, an extension of it under the sea.",
416
The Court legitimated the principle of contiguity. Continental shelf
rights were an appurtenance which was based on the coastal state sover-
eignty over its land territory. 417 This principle, which was derived from
the Truman Proclamation, had been advocated by many prominent
scholars.41 8
Second, the International Court of Justice determined that the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf was declaratory, not constitutive, re-
413 1969 I.C.J. 3, 22.
414 Herman, supra note 186, at 210.
415 1969 I.C.J. 3, 53.
416 Id at 31.
417 Jennings, The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implications of the
North Sea Case Judgment, 18 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 818, 821-25 (1969); Phrand, Continental Shelf
Redefinition, 4 McGILL L.J. 536, 538-540.
418 Lauterpacht has stated that:
The direct proximity of the coastal State; the fact that the continental shelf constitutes a
natural prolongation of its territory and that the mineral deposits of the shelf and of the
mainland may form a common pool; the special interest of the coastal State in the explora-
tion of the resources of the continental shelf; the circumstance, that it is geographically in
the best position to do so, and its legitimate reluctance to permit other States to establish
themselves, for that purpose in the direct proximity of the oast ... substantiate the reasona-
bleness of the claim of the coastal State to those areas.
Lauterpacht, supra note 189, at 633; see also, supra notes 351-55.
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garding continental shelf rights. The Court viewed the Convention as
"reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at least emergent rules of cus-
tomary international law."4 19
Several of the justices' clearly indicated that the Convention on the
Continental Shelf merely codified existing principles of customary inter-
national law.42 Justice Bustamantey Rivero found that continental shelf
rights were based on the Truman Proclamation and on Articles One and
Two of the Convention. The Justice stated that "certain basic con-
cepts... the acceptance of which corresponds to a well-nigh universally
held opinion, or the sense of which necessarily flows from the very con-
cept of the continental shelf, are already sufficiently deeply anchored for
such incorporation [into general international law] to be possible."421
Justice Padilla stated that "the first three articles of the Convention
were intended to be broadly declaratory of existing customary interna-
tional law.... "422 He proceeded to declare that "[t]he right of a coastal
State to its continental shelf exists independently of the express recogni-
tion thereof in the first three articles of the Convention.... ,423 Judge
Ammoun pointed out that the recognition of continental shelf rights did
not involve an extension of territorial sovereignty, but constituted the
right to explore, exploit, and protect the natural resources of the conti-
nental shelf which are recognized as part of customary international
law.4
24
Third, the International Court of Justice held that continental shelf
rights existed ipso facto and ab initio. The Court stated
the most fundamental of all rules relating to the continental shelf, en-
shrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, although quite
independent of it (is) that the rights of the coastal State in respect of
the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of
its land territory into and under the sea exist ipsofacto and ab initio, by
virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an
exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed
and exploiting its natural resources.
In short, there is here an inherent right.4 2 5Since continental shelf
rights exist ipso facto, there was no need for any occupation or a procla-
mation to realize such rights.4 26 Furthermore, since continental shelf
419 Supra note 203, at 30.
420 Nordquist, supra note 407, at 65-71.
421 1969 I.C.J. at 58; see also supra note 407, at 71.
422 1969 I.C.J. at 96; see also, supra note 407, at 71.
423 1969 I.C.J. at 97; see also, supra note 407, at 71.
424 1969 I.CJ. at 118; see also, supra note 407, at 74.
425 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 23 (1969).
426 The ICJ stated that:
[i]n order to exercise [an inherent right to explore and exploit seabed resources], no special
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rights exist ab initio, such rights were retroactive.427 D. P. O'Connell
stated that "the expression ab initio suggests a relation back in time,
perhaps geological time, for what the Court appears to mean is that no
history of events can be utilized to negate any coastal state's inherent
rights to the seabed, even though, when the events occurred, the
continental shelf doctrine was not imagined."4 28 The Newfoundland
Court of Appeal, referring to O'Connell's statement, held that ab initio
refers back either to geological time, to when sovereignty over the land
mass was first established, to when the submarine areas... became ex-
ploitable, or to when the continental shelf became an area of active inter-
est to a state.4 29 The Newfoundland Court of Appeal determined that
the time the area became the subject of interest to the state was the most
logical and in accordance with British practice.43 0 The Newfoundland
Court of Appeal stated that "we are satisfied, then, that at the relevant
date [1949], there were rights to the resources of the continental shelf
under international law exercisable by coastal States, including
Newfoundland. 431
VIII. THE ATLANTIC ACCORD AND HIBERNIA AGREEMENT
Newfoundland was more successful in the political realm after the
reference. On February 11, 1985, Newfoundland and Canada signed the
Atlantic Accord which covered offshore oil and gas resource manage-
ment and revenue sharing in the area below the low water mark to the
continental shelf margin 43 2 The Atlantic Accord provided for joint ad-
ministration and ensured that the pace and manner of offshore develop-
ment would optimize social and economic benefits for Newfoundland
and Canada. The Atlantic Accord was designed to provide a stable off-
shore management regime for the petroleum industry which would help
legal process has to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to be performed. Its
existence can be declared (many States have done this) but does not need to be constituted.
Furthermore, the right does not depend on its being exercised. To echo the language of
the Geneva Convention, it is "exclusive" in the sense that if the coastal State does not
choose to explore or exploit the areas of shelf appertaining to it, that is its own affair, but
no one else may do so without its express consent.
Id.
427 O'CONNELL, supra note 188, at 578.
428 O'Connell, The Federal Problem Concerning Maritime Domain in Commonwealth Coun-
tries, I J. MAR. L. & CoM. 389, 407 (1970).
429 145 D.L.R.3d at 39.
430 Id.
431 Id.
432 The issue ofjurisdiction over the territorial sea remains unresolved. Day, Maritime Bound-
aries, Jurisdictional Disputes, and Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration in Eastern Canada, 23 J. CAN.
STUDIES 60, 77-81 (1988). See also MacDonald and Thompson, TheAtlanticAccord: The Politics of
Compromise, 24 ALTA. L. REV. 61 (1985); R. Sinclair, The Atlantic Accord Joint Management of
Offshore Oil and Gas Resources off Newfoundland and Labrador, Bus. & LAW, July 1985, at 52.
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Canada to achieve national energy self-sufficiency.433
The Atlantic Accord provided for the establishment of a Canadian-
Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board to administer offshore energy
development. The Board would consist of seven members, three ap-
pointed by the province and three by the federal government, with the
chair being jointly selected. The Board would make decisions regarding
the regulation and management of offshore energy activities, such as the
declaration of discoveries, the granting of production licenses, the en-
forcement of policy compliance, the administration of good oil field
practices, and the exercise of emergency powers respecting safety, spills
and conservation.434
The Canadian Parliament and the provincial government retained
authority over certain areas. The Canadian Parliament retained jurisdic-
tion relating to Canadianization policy, legislation of general applica-
tion not specifically related to oil and gas, and federal taxation.4 35 The
Newfoundland government retained jurisdiction over the royalty regime,
provincial revenues, and applicable provincial legislation.4 36 Both the
federal and provincial governments had the right to review decisions of
the Board regarding "fundamental decisions" which included the issu-
ance of leases, the enforcement of compliance orders, and the choice of
modes of development. If there was disagreement between the federal
433 The purposes of the Accord are
a) to provide for the development of oil and gas resources offshore Newfoundland for the
benefit of Canada as a whole and Newfoundland and Labrador in particular,
b) to protect, preserve, and advance the attainment of national self-sufficiency and secur-
ity of supply;
c) to recognize the right of Newfoundland and Labrador to be the principal beneficiary of
the oil and gas resources off its shores, consistent with the requirement for a strong and
united Canada;
d) to recognize the equality of both governments in the management of the resource, and
ensure that the pace and manner of development optimize the social and economic
benefits to Canada as a whole and to Newfoundland and Labrador in particular,
e) to provide that the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador can establish and
collect resource revenues as if these resources were on land, within the province;
f) to provide for a stable and permanent arrangement for the management of offshore
adjacent to Newfoundland by enacting the relevant provisions of this Accord in legisla-
tion of the Parliament of Canada and the Legislature of Newfoundland and Labrador
and by providing that the Accord may only be amended by the mutual consent of both
governments; and
g) to promote with the system of joint management, insofar as is appropriate, consistency
with the management regimes established for other offshore areas in Canada.
Atlantic Accord, at 2.
434 Id at 3. Ministers may jointly direct the Board in writing concerning: i) fundamental
decisions; ii) the public review process; iii) Canada and Newfoundland benefits; and iv) stud-
ies and the provision of policy advice. Id at 10.
435 Id at 5.
436 Id at 6.
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and provincial governments, the Accord provided a resolution
procedure.437
The Accord allowed revenue sharing between Canada and New-
foundland in the same manner as that done with other provinces regard-
ing onshore petroleum resources. Newfoundland could establish and
collect revenues from offshore operations as if the resources were located
on land within the province. Newfoundland would receive the proceeds
from royalties, corporate income tax, sales tax, bonus payments, and
rental and license fees. Newfoundland would not lose equalization pay-
ments on a dollar for dollar basis as a result of the offshore revenues.
The federal government would establish a schedule of equalization off-
set payments.4 38
The Accord required the establishment of a development fund to
defray economic and social infrastructure costs and to ensure that the
province would be in a position to realize the economic benefits of off-
shore development. The Accord required the employment and training
of Newfoundland workers, preference for local companies providing
goods and services, and the establishment of a research and develop-
ment program within the province. The Accord also provided for the
establishment of an oil pollution and fishing compensation regime.4
Both Newfoundland and Canada were required to enact legislation
implementing the Accord within one year. The legislation would super-
sede the Canadian Oil and Gas Act and the Oil and Gas Production and
Conservation Act as they applied to offshore areas. Once the legislation
was enacted, mutual consent would be necessary for any amend-
ments."' In 1986, both the federal and provincial governments enacted
legislation implementing the Accord. 41
On July 18, 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney and Newfoundland
Premier Peckford signed a "Statement of Principles" with the Hibernia
consortium" 2 (hereinafter referred to as project owners) to proceed
with development on the Hibernia Oil Field which was expected to yield
525-650 million barrels of oil. The project owners estimated that the cost
to bring the field into production would be $5.2 billion over six years, an
additional $3.3 billion in development costs would be incurred post pro-
437 Id. at 6-9.
438 Id. at 11-12.
439 Id at 13-14.
4 40 Id. at 16.
441 The Canada-Newfoundland Implementation Act, at provincial level. The Canada-New-
foundland Implementation (Newfoundland) Act.
442 The Hibernia consortium is comprised of Chevron Canada Resources, Columbia Gas
Development of Canada Ltd., Gulf Canada Resources Ltd., Mobil Oil of Canada, and Petro-
Canada Inc. Statement of Principles Hibernia Development Project, July 1988, at 1.
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duction, and operating costs would be $11.5 billion. 43
Each of the parties to the agreement agreed to incur certain costs.
The Canadian government agreed to contribute $1.04 billion in capital
costs; to guarantee loans up to $1.66 billion; to provide a guarantee for a
temporary financing facility to cover cost overruns and a negative pro-
ject cash flow; and to apply the existing tax structure to the project. 444
The Newfoundland government agreed not to levy the provincial retail
sales tax against either the pre- or post-production start up capital ex-
penditures; to levy a four percent provincial sales tax against the project's
operating costs; to provide $11 million from the Offshore Technology
Transfer Fund to the project owners in recognition of their commitment
to design engineering activities in Newfoundland. 4 5
Both Canada and Newfoundland agreed to allocate $95 million
from the Canadian-Newfoundland Offshore Development Fund for the
construction of facilities for offshore operations; to allow production
from the area full access to domestic and international markets; and to
permit a level of production which was consistent with good reservoir
management.4 The project owners agreed to exercise due diligence and
commit $1 billion to bring the field into production; to give preference to
Canadians, with consideration to Newfoundlanders, regarding the provi-
sions of goods and services and employment opportunities; to ensure that
45-50% of the primary expenditures be of Canadian-Newfoundland
content; to assemble the main support frame in Newfoundland; to grant
85-90% of the project's administration and engineering design contracts
to Canadian companies; to develop working arrangements with the pro-
vincial government to allocate their respective shares of salaries and
wages to employees of Newfoundland; to pay Newfoundland a basic
and supplementary royalty; and to provide Canada with the opportunity
of a 10% net profit interest.' 7 The terms of the agreement were to be
monitored by the Canadian-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum
Board.44 This agreement realized many of the goals which Newfound-
land sought to achieve prior to the reference.
IX. CONCLUSION
There was a battle between the federal and provincial government
of Newfoundland regarding jurisdiction over offshore lands located be-
neath the territorial sea and on the continental shelf. When negotiations
443 Id. at 4.
444 Id. at 5-9.
445 Id. at 10.
446 Id. at 11.
447 I at 12-20.
448 Id. at 12-13.
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failed to resolve the conflict, litigation ensued. The Newfoundland Court
of Appeal determined that Newfoundland held jurisdiction over the
lands beneath its territorial sea, but not over the continental shelf. The
Supreme Court of Canada held that Newfoundland lacked jurisdiction
over the continental shelf. Both courts were mistaken regarding New-
foundland's jurisdiction over the continental shelf. Newfoundland was a
self-governing colony which exercised jurisdiction over its territorial sea.
In 1926, Newfoundland achieved dominion status under the Balfour
Declaration. As a dominion, Newfoundland continued to exercise its ju-
risdiction over the territorial sea.
Newfoundland did not surrender its sovereignty during the Com-
mission government which ruled Newfoundland from 1934 through
1949. International law does not favor a relinquishment of sovereignty,
but recognizes that a nation only surrenders those powers which it volun-
tarily transfers. Although Newfoundland lacked self-government, Great
Britain and other nations continued to acknowledge Newfoundland's
sovereignty. Even if Newfoundland lost its sovereign status during the
Commission government, Term 7 of the Terms of Union revived New-
foundland's sovereign status as a dominion immediately prior to confed-
eration. This entitled Newfoundland to the rights which were
established under international law prior to confederation.
Term 37 of the Terms of Union granted Newfoundland "all lands,
mines, minerals, and royalties belonging to Newfoundland at the date of
Union." The rights granted to Newfoundland under Term 37 were not
only common law property rights, but also included the Crown property
over which Newfoundland had beneficial use, control, management,
and disposition. This property was not restricted to Newfoundland's
land territory. Newfoundland was not required to surrender any of its
property to be on an equal footing with the other Canadian provinces.
The federal government's role as external sovereign did not grant the
federal government property rights over offshore areas. Consequently,
when Newfoundland confederated with Canada in 1949, Newfoundland
was entitled to all property which the Crown held in right of the prov-
ince, including that recognized by international law.
At the time of confederation, the Crown recognized rights over the
territorial sea. From the seventeenth to the twentieth century, the
Crown claimed jurisdiction over the "great waste of the sea." In the
nineteenth century, the Crown focused on the three mile territorial sea.
British recognition of a three mile territorial sea was evidenced in inter-
national agreements, statutes, the writings of publicists, and judicial
decisions. There was no question regarding the Crown's prerogative
rights over offshore areas until Regina v. Keyn in 1876. The Court for
the Crown Cases Reserved declared that Admiralty and the county
courts lacked jurisdiction over offenses committed by foreigners three
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miles offshore because this area was outside of the realm. The Court's
decision in Keyn, which was an anomaly, only dealt with the jurisdiction
of the common law courts, not the status of the territorial sea. Parlia-
ment responded to the Keyn decision by enacting the Territorial Waters
Jurisdiction Act in 1878 which restored the Crown's rights over the terri-
torial sea "as they had always existed."
Great Britain continued to recognize the three mile territorial sea
after Keyn. This was manifested in international agreements, statutes,
and judicial decisions. There were statements in several English cases
which affirmed the Crown's proprietary interest in the territorial sea.
The Privy Council's decision in Secretary of State v. Chelikani effectively
overruled Keyn. Furthermore, the Privy Council, in several Canadian
fisheries cases, inferred that the provinces held property rights in the
seabed of the territorial sea.
Great Britain recognized Newfoundland's territorial sea. New-
foundland exercised jurisdiction over its territorial sea through fishing,
hovering, and customs acts. The Newfoundland Supreme Court ac-
knowledged Newfoundland's jurisdiction over the territorial sea. When
Newfoundland achieved dominion status under the Balfour Declaration
in 1926, Newfoundland became the heir to the rights held by the Crown
for the province. Newfoundland possessed the same degree of sover-
eignty as Canada and Australia. The Canadian Supreme Court in the
British Columbia Offshore Reference decided that Canada attained the
Crown's offshore rights when it became an independent nation between
1919 and 1931. The High Court of Australia also determined that Aus-
tralia acquired the Crown's offshore rights when it achieved indepen-
dence after World War I. Since Newfoundland was in the same position
as Canada and Australia, Newfoundland inherited the Crown's rights
over the territorial sea when it became a dominion in 1926. Newfound-
land continued to exercise jurisdiction over its territorial sea after 1926
and did not surrender such rights during the Commission government.
Consequently, when Newfoundland confederated with Canada in 1949,
Newfoundland retained its rights over the territorial sea under Term 37
of the Terms of Union.
Continental shelf rights were recognized as a principle of customary
international law when Newfoundland confederated with Canada in
1949. Rights over the continental shelf were first asserted by the United
States in the Truman Proclamation in 1945. Continental shelf rights rap-
idly evolved into a principle of customary international law. Since the
assertion of rights over the continental shelf represented little change in
existing international practice and had the support of the world's leading
maritime powers, the United States and Great Britain, a long period of
incubation was not required to establish such a principle of customary
international law. Furthermore, the lack of protest by nations to conti-
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nental shelf claims demonstrated general acceptance of the principle and
served as an estoppel regarding future objections.
The International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases provided additional support for Newfoundland's claim of
jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The Court held that the Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf simply reflected existing customary interna-
tional law. The Court declared that a coastal state's rights over the
continental shelf existed ipso facto and ab initio. This meant that New-
foundland possessed rights over the continental shelf because the conti-
nental shelf was a natural prolongation of its land territory.
Continental shelf rights were an appurtenance to Newfoundland's sover-
eign rights over its territory. There was no requirement of any occupa-
tion or a proclamation to assert such rights which were established
under international law. Newfoundland attained rights over the conti-
nental shelf when it was a dominion. Newfoundland never surrendered
these rights. Consequently, Newfoundland retained rights over the con-
tinental shelf under Term 37 of the Terms of Union.
The Supreme Court of Canada in the Newfoundland Offshore Ref-
erence made many of the same errors as the United States Supreme
Court in the tidelands controversy.' 9 First, both Canadian and United
States Supreme Courts failed to acknowledge the sovereign status of the
dominion or the states. In United States v. Maine, the United States
Supreme Court refused to recognize the independent sovereignty of the
original states which was established under the Treaty of Paris in
1783.45° In the Newfoundland Offshore Reference, the Supreme Court
of Canada incorrectly determined that Newfoundland relinquished its
sovereignty during the Commission government and that Term 7 of the
Terms of Union did not revive Newfoundland's rights as a dominion
prior to confederation.
Second, both the Canadian and United States Supreme Courts de-
termined that the dominion or the states had to surrender control over
their offshore property too be on an equal footing with the other prov-
inces or states. In United States v. Texas, the United States Supreme
Court required Texas, which was an independent nation from 1836
through 1845 to cede control over its three marine league territorial
sea.45 1 The United States Supreme Court failed to recognize that the
equal footing clause only pertained to political and sovereign rights, not
to property rights.452 In the Newfoundland Offshore Reference, the
449 Fitzgerald, supra note 1.
450 Id. at 237-40; 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
451 Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 217-18; 339 U.S. 707 (1950). The traditional three mile mari-
time belt is one marine league in width. Thus, three marine leagues would be approximately nine
miles in territorial sea.
452 339 U.S. at 722.
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Supreme Court of Canada failed to realize that there was no equal foot-
ing requirement under the Canadian Constitution. Furthermore, each
province was unique with regard to control over its natural resources.
Third, both the Canadian and United States Supreme Courts failed
to acknowledge that both the Canadian and United States Constitutions
limited the property to be surrendered by the dominion or the states to
the federal government upon the establishment of the union."'
Finally, both the Canadian and United States Supreme Courts erro-
neously determined that the federal government's role as external sover-
eign established federal jurisdiction over offshore lands.454 Both Courts
misconceived the relationship between international and constitutional
law.
International law establishes rights between nations, such as rights
over the continental shelf. Continental shelf rights are both a sovereign
right and a property right. They are a sovereign right, the right to
exercise legislative jurisdiction, which is granted to coastal states under
international law. They are, by nature, a property right, the right to
explore and exploit the resources of the area. International law does not
determine the allocation of power or property rights between the federal
and the provincial or state governments in federal systems like Canada
and the United States. This is a question of constitutional law.455 Both
the Canadian and United States Supreme Courts failed to make this criti-
cal distinction between international and constitutional law. Both
courts utilized international law to resolve questions of constitutional
law. This resulted in decisions which were not justified by either interna-
tional or constitutional law.
Political intervention was necessary to rectify the erroneous deci-
sions of the Canadian and United States Supreme Courts. In Canada,
the federal and provincial government of Newfoundland negotiated the
Atlantic Accord which provided for joint management and revenue shar-
ing regarding offshore energy development.4 56 In the United States, the
Submerged Lands Act was enacted which granted the coastal states juris-
diction over the three mile territorial sea and in some cases three marine
leagues in the Gulf of Mexico.457 The federal government was granted
453 Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 239-40.
454 Id. at 212-18; United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). See also United States v.
Maine, 420 U.S. at 523-26.
455 Head, The Legal Clamour Over Canadian Offshore Minerals, 5 ALTA. L. REv. 312, 315
(1967).
456 This agreement served as a model for the Nova Scotia Accord which modifies the 1982
Nova Scotia Accord and places Nova Scotia on the same footing as Newfoundland. Cullen, Canada
and Australia; A Federal Parting of the Ways, 18 FED. L. REv. 53, 80 (1989).
457 Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301-1315 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Texas and Florida
were awarded three marine league boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico. United States v. Louisiana, 363
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jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea in the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.4 8 Through these political settle-
ments the province of Newfoundland and the coastal states were able to
achieve partial victories in their battles against the federal governments
over the control of offshore energy resources.
U.S. 1, 33-66 (1960), United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960). See also, Fitzgerald, supra note
1, at 221.
458 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see
also, Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REv.
23 (1953).
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